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We study equilibrium wage and employment dynamics in a class of popular search models with
wage posting, in the presence of aggregate productivity shocks. Firms offer and commit to (Markov)
contracts, which specify a wage contingent on all payoff-relevant states, but must pay equally all of their
workers, who have limited commitment and are free to quit at any time. We find sufficient conditions for
the existence and uniqueness of a stochastic search equilibrium in such contracts, which is Rank Preserving
[RP]: larger and more productive firms offer more generous contracts to their workers in all states of the
world. On the RP equilibrium path, turnover is always efficient as workers always move from less to
more productive firms. The resulting stochastic dynamics of firm size provide an intuitive explanation for
the empirical finding that large employers have more cyclical job creation (Moscarini and Postel-Vinay,
2012). Finally, computation of RP equilibrium contracts is tractable.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The continuous reallocation of employment across firms, sectors and occupations, mediated by
various kinds of frictions, is a powerful source of aggregate productivity growth.1 Workers move in
response to various reallocative shocks, and search on and off the job to take advantage of the large
wage dispersion that they face. A popular class of search wage-posting models, originating with
Burdett and Mortensen (1998, henceforth BM), aims to understand these phenomena. The BM
model provides a coherent formalization of the hypothesis that cross-sectional wage dispersion
is a consequence of labour market frictions, and started a fruitful line of research in the analysis
of wage inequality and worker turnover, as the vibrant and empirically very successful literature
building on that hypothesis continues to show (see Mortensen, 2003 for an overview). When
allowing for heterogeneity in firm-level TFP, the BM model is a natural framework to study
employment reallocation across firms.
This job search literature, however, is invariably cast in deterministic steady state. Ever since
the first formulation of the BM model, job search scholars have regarded the characterization of its
1. See Foster et al. (2000) and Lentz and Mortensen (2008) for recent evidence.
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out-of-steady-state behaviour as a daunting problem, essentially because one of the model’s state
variables, which is also the main object of interest, is the endogenous distribution of wage offers.
This is an infinite-dimensional object, endogenously determined in equilibrium as the distribution
across firms of offer strategies that are mutual best responses, which evolves stochastically with
the aggregate impulse.
The restriction to steady-state analysis is not costless. The ongoing reallocation of employment
across firms has a cyclical pattern. Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2012, henceforth MPV12)
document that the net job creation of larger, higher paying firms is more positively correlated with
GDP, and more negatively with the unemployment rate, than at smaller firms, at business cycle
frequencies. Essentially, the firm size/growth relationship “tilts” up and down with the business
cycle.2 Any theory of turnover and wage dispersion based on frictional worker reallocation among
firms, and allowing for aggregate dynamics, speaks directly to these facts.
In this article, we provide the first analysis of aggregate stochastic dynamics in wage-posting
models with random search. We study a frictional labour market where firms offer and commit
to employment contracts, workers search randomly on and off the job for those contracts, while
aggregate productivity is subject to persistent shocks. In our economy, both in the constrained
efficient allocation and in equilibrium, smaller firms contribute relatively more to net job creation
when unemployment is high, consistently with MPV12’s observations.
Our key contribution overcomes the technical hurdle that stunted progress of the job search
literature beyond steady-state analysis. We find sufficient conditions for a unique equilibrium,
in which the distribution of wage contracts is easy to track: the workers’ ranking of firms is the
same in all aggregate states—what we call a Rank-Preserving Equilibrium (RPE). The sufficient
conditions are simple. If firms are equally productive, no further restrictions are needed, and the
unique equilibrium is RP and features, as in BM, dispersion in contracts and firm size. On the
RPE path, initially larger firms always offer more and remain larger. If all firms have the same
initial size, they randomize on the first offer, then diverge in size and we are back to the previous
case. If firms differ in the permanent component of their productivity, then a sufficient (but not
necessary) condition for the unique equilibrium to be a RPE is a restriction on initial conditions:
more productive firms are initially (weakly) larger—e.g. all firms start empty. More productive
firms then offer a larger value and employ more workers at all points in time. Given a chance, a
worker always moves from a less into a more productive firm, so that equilibrium reallocation of
employment is constrained efficient. This parallels a similar property of BM’s static equilibrium.
In our economy, infinitely lived and risk neutral firms and workers come in contact
infrequently. Firms produce homogenous output with labour in a linear technology, which may
permanently differ across firms. Aggregate multiplicative TFP shocks affect labour productivity
as well as the job contact rates, on and off the job, the exogenous job destruction rate, and the value
of leisure. A social planner constrained by search frictions and given job contact rates, when given
the opportunity, moves an employed worker from a less productive to a more productive firm.
This efficient turnover gives rise to a simple process for the evolution of the firm size distribution,
which can be solved for analytically, given any history of aggregate shocks. The solution replicates
the MPV12 facts: larger firms grow relatively faster when aggregate TFP is high. If we shut down
aggregate shocks, this process converges deterministically to BM’s stationary size distribution.
To study equilibrium, we assume that firms offer and commit to a Markov contract, where
the wage is allowed to depend on all four payoff-relevant states: two exogenous, firm-specific
2. Haltiwanger et al. (2010) present the most comprehensive study to date on the firm size/growth relationship,
based on the full longitudinal census of U.S. employers (Longitudinal Business Database, 1976–2005), the same data
underlying MPV12’s evidence. They find that a firm’s growth is negatively related to its size, much less so when controlling
for mean reversion, and not at all when controlling for firm age. They do not address business cycle patterns.
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and aggregate productivity, one endogenous to the firm, its current size, and one endogenous
to the economy but exogenous to the firm, the distribution of employment across all firms. We
impose only one further restriction, in order to obtain a well-defined notion of a firm. Following
BM, we define a firm as a wage policy, thus impose an equal treatment constraint: the firm must
pay the same wage in a given period to all of its employees, whether incumbent, newly hired
from unemployment or from employment. Workers cannot commit not to quit to other jobs when
the opportunity arises, or to unemployment whenever they please, so commitment is one-sided
and firms face a standard moral hazard problem. We establish that at most one Markov contract-
posting equilibrium exists, characterize it, and show that it decentralizes the constrained efficient
allocation, thus is consistent with MPV12’s evidence.
We then extend our analysis to allow for endogenous contact rates. We allow firms to post
vacancies, at a convex cost, to meet job-seekers through a standard matching function. We prove
that equilibrium turnover is RP for two reasons: more productive, larger firms both spend more
effort to contact workers and offer more to each worker they contact. As before, workers always
move up the productivity ladder, although not necessarily at the constrained efficient speed. We
present an algorithm to compute RPE allocation and contracts.
Key to our analysis is the following comparative dynamics property of the best-response
contract offer: at any node in the game and for any distribution of offers made by other firms and
values earned by employed workers, the more productive and/or larger a firm, the more generous
the continuation value of the contract it offers to its existing and new workers. Therefore, if firms
are homogeneous, or if more productive firms are initially no smaller, then no firm wants to break
ranks in the distribution of competing offers, which then coincides with the given distribution of
firm productivity or initial size. This immediately implies our main result that equilibrium, if it
exists, is unique, and is also RP, thus constrained efficient.
The intuition behind this comparative dynamics property parallels and extends a single-
crossing property of the static BM model. There, a more productive firm gains more from
employing a worker, hence wants to (and can) pay a higher wage. In addition, under the equal
treatment constraint, backloading incentives (i.e. reducing the current wage in exchange for a
higher continuation value, while maintaining the current promised value) has several effects on
profits. First, it increases hires and their future labour costs, both effects independent of current
size. Second, it increases retention, proportionally to current size. Third, it shifts the labour cost
of existing workers to the future: promising a higher continuation value to those workers among
the existing workforce who will still be around tomorrow to receive the higher value allows the
firm to cut today’s wage, while still maintaining incentives. Both effects are proportional to initial
size, and we show that they exactly cancel out. Thus, on net, the marginal effect of backloading on
profits is increasing in size, through the retention effect only. As a consequence, ceteris paribus,
a larger firm also wants to pay more from tomorrow on. The incentive effect of a firm’s size
on its wage offers has been, so far, overlooked in the literature following BM, because there,
size is pinned down by the steady-state requirement. This effect clearly emerges in our dynamic
stochastic setting, where firm size is an evolving state variable, with given initial conditions.
For the same reason, the monotonic relationship between size, productivity and wages that
holds on the equilibrium path in steady state does not immediately extend to the dynamic case. It
does, provided that weakly more productive firms are initially weakly larger, because the initial
size ranking self-perpetuates, so that more productive firms always pay and employ more. This
intuitive and natural outcome is unique despite the strategic complementarity of a wage-posting
game.
The restriction on initial conditions derives from the size-dependence of equilibrium contracts.
As we discuss in Section 7, size-dependence limits the scope of our analysis in terms of firms’
entry and idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Making contracts size-independent requires either
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relaxing equal treatment, which is a special case of our analysis, with similar results, but losing any
notion of firm size—so that the model can no longer address our motivating empirical evidence
from MPV12—or assuming a specific functional form of the matching technology. We discuss
these alternatives in detail.
As a by-product of our analysis, we offer a methodological contribution. We formulate the first
(to the best of our knowledge) theory of Monotone Comparative Dynamics in a dynamic stochastic
decision problem. In our setting, firms solve a fully dynamic problem in a changing environment,
and make choices over an infinite sequence (a stochastic process). In the sequential formulation
of this problem, the objective function of the one-step Bellman maximization contains the value
function of the problem, whose properties are ex ante unknown. We show how the optimal policy
changes with a parameter of the model (firm productivity) which affects initial conditions and
current payoffs, but could also affect the law of motion of the state variables, a property not yet
addressed by the theory of Monotone Comparative Statics (Topkis, 1998).3
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we place our contribution in the
context of the relevant literature. In Section 3 we lay out the basic environment. In Section 4 we
characterize the constrained efficient allocation. In Section 5 we describe and formally define an
equilibrium, introduce the notion of RPE, characterize RPE contracts, and present uniqueness
and existence results. In Section 6 we extend the model to allow for endogenous hiring effort by
firms, and establish again our main equilibrium characterization result, stating that every Markov
equilibrium must be RP. In Section 7 we revisit our assumptions and discuss the robustness and
interpretation of our results. Section 8 concludes and describes future research.
2. RELATED LITERATURE
Besides its intrinsic theoretical interest, our characterization of the dynamics of the BM model
opens the analysis of aggregate labour market dynamics as a whole potential new field of
application of search/wage-posting models, such as explaining the evidence in MPV12. More
generally, we hope to contribute to a synthesis between the BM contract-posting approach and the
“other”, equally successful side of the search literature, organized around the matching framework
(Pissarides, 1990; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994), initially designed for the understanding of
labour market flows and equilibrium unemployment.
The analysis of equilibrium wage and employment dynamics in equilibrium search models
with wage dispersion has recently become a subject of keen investigation. As a stepping stone
to the present article, Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2009, MPV09) and its discussion by Shimer
(2009) study the deterministic transitional dynamics of the BM model. The main result is that the
allocation of BM’s steady-state solution is globally stable: under relatively weak conditions, a BM
economy converges asymptotically to the stationary distribution of sizes and wages. The present
article extends the analysis to stochastic dynamics under aggregate uncertainty. This requires a
conceptual and technical step, because the entire distribution of wage offers is a state variable
that can no longer be simply summarized by calendar time.
Rudanko (2011) and Menzio and Shi (2011) analyse wage contract-posting models with
aggregate productivity shocks, where job search is directed. This assumption greatly simplifies
3. The literature tackled the different question whether the optimal policy is monotonic in a state variable (Stokey
and Lucas, 1989), sometimes using our same tools (Gonzalez and Shi, 2010). The logic of our comparative dynamics
argument can be applied in many other settings. For example, one may ask in a stochastic growth model whether the
socially optimal level of investment is decreasing at all states and dates in the initial stock of capital, in the labour share, or
in risk aversion; in each case, one must track the effect of the parameter change on the endogenous state variable (capital)
along the entire optimal path. In this analogy, the existing literature investigates instead when is investment monotonic
in the current level of capital.
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the analysis by severing the link between the individual firm’s contract-posting problem and
the distribution of contract offers. This is the main hurdle that we face, and that we resolve by
exploiting the emergence of Rank-Preserving Equilibria, while maintaining BM’s assumption of
random search common to the majority of the search literature. While we see both programs as
fruitful directions of theoretical exploration, from a quantitative viewpoint the directed search
approach is focused on the response of the job-finding rate to aggregate shocks, and does not
generate a well-defined notion of employer size. Hence, it does not speak to MPV12’s facts, that
we envision as central to our understanding of the propagation of aggregate shocks in labour
markets. Kaas and Kircher (2011) extend Menzio and Shi’s model, to allow for firm size. They
obtain interesting and empirically accurate predictions on firm growth, pay, and recruitment
strategies, but do not allow for on-the-job search and do not address MPV12’s business cycle
facts.
Robin (2011) introduces aggregate productivity shocks in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002)’s
sequential auction model. Lack of commitment to offers, and renegotiation on receipt of an outside
job offer, make the distribution of wages not a relevant state variable for equilibrium, and the
framework quite tractable for business cycle analysis. Again, this model has no natural definition
of firm size.
Finally, Coles and Mortensen (2011, henceforth CM) build on our notion of RPE to
characterize the dynamic equilibrium of Coles’ (2001) version of the BM model, which closely
resembles ours, except that firms cannot explicitly commit to wage contracts, but do so
through reputation. They endogenize firms’ hiring behaviour using a standard matching-function
approach, only specifying a firm’s recruitment cost per current employee as a function of new
hires per current employee.4 This assumption makes a firm’s wage policy size-independent and
guarantees a unique equilibrium within the RP class. In our setup, the RPE is unique among
all (not just RP) equilibria. If firms are identical, this result always holds true and our analysis
nests that of CM. When firms differ by productivity, to establish RPE we impose an additional
restriction on initial conditions. CM’s ingenious, albeit still knife-edge, assumption on the hiring
technology allows them to dispose of initial restrictions and to accommodate firm entry anywhere
in the productivity distribution, as well as specific idiosyncratic productivity processes. Because
they only study deterministic transitional dynamics, their model cannot be confronted yet with
MPV12’s business cycle facts.
3. THE ECONOMY
Time t =0,1,2... is discrete. The labour market is populated by a unit–mass of workers, who
can be either employed or unemployed, and by a unit measure of firms.5 Workers and firms are
risk neutral, infinitely lived, and maximize payoffs discounted with common factor β∈(0,1).
Firms operate constant-return technologies with labour as the only input and with productivity
scale ωtp, where ωt ∈ is an aggregate component, evolving according to a stationary first-order
Markov process Q(dωt+1 |ωt), and p is a fixed, firm-specific component, distributed across firms
p according to a c.d.f.  over some positive interval
[
p,p
]
.
The labour market is affected by search frictions in that unemployed workers can only sample
job offers sequentially with some probability λt ∈(0,1] at time t, and while searching enjoy a
4. Formally, if a firm employs L workers and looks at hiring H new workers, it will incur a total cost of Lc(H/L)
where c(·) is an increasing and strictly convex function.
5. A firm can be inactive when its productivity is too low relative to the worker value of leisure. So the unit measure
of firms includes all potential producers, active and inactive. We discuss in Section 7 alternative assumptions about entry.
That the mass of firms and workers both have measure one is obviously innocuous and only there to simplify the notation.
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value of leisure bt . Employed workers earn a wage and also sample job offers with probability
sλt ∈(0,1] each period, so that s is the search intensity of employed relative to unemployed job-
seekers. Workers can only send one job application, hence can never receive more than one offer
per time period. All firms of equal productivity p start out with the same labour force. We denote
by Nt :
[
p,p
]
→ [0,1] the cumulated population distribution of employment across firm types.
So N0(p) is the (given) initial measure of employment at firms of productivity at most p, Nt (p)
is employment and ut =1−Nt (p) the unemployment (rate) at time t. Each employed worker is
separated from his employer and enters unemployment every period with probability δt ∈(0,1].
We maintain throughout the assumption that the destruction rate is exogenous and a function
of the aggregate productivity state δt =δ(ωt). Similarly for the flow value of non-production
bt =b(ωt). For much of the analysis we also assume that the job contact rate is an exogenous
function of the aggregate state λt =λ(ωt), and sampling of firms by workers is uniform, in that
any worker receiving a job offer draws the type of the firm from which the offer emanates from
the distribution (·). In Section 6 we endogenize this map λ(·) and sampling weights as the result
of optimal vacancy posting given a standard matching function, and we extend our main results
to this case.
In each period, the timing is as follows. Given a current state ωt of aggregate labour
productivity and distribution of employed workers Nt :
(1) production and payments take place at all firms in state ωt ; the flow benefit bt accrues to
unemployed workers;
(2) the new state ωt+1 of aggregate labour productivity is realized;
(3) employed workers can quit to unemployment;
(4) jobs are destroyed exogenously with chance δt+1;
(5) the remaining employed workers receive an outside offer with chance sλt+1 and decide
whether to accept it or to stay with the current employer;
(6) each previously unemployed worker receives an offer with probability λt+1.
Finally, in order to avert unnecessary complications, and to simplify the illustration, we assume
that the state space  is finite, the distribution of firm types, , has continuous and everywhere
strictly positive density γ =′ over
[
p,p
]
, and the initial measure of employment across firm
types, N0, is continuously differentiable in p. Therefore, the initial average size of a type-p firm,
which is given by L0(p)= (dN0(p)/dp)/(γ (p)), is a continuous function of p. The case of equally
productive firms, where  is a mass point, is simpler and we will refer to it separately.
4. THE CONSTRAINED EFFICIENT ALLOCATION
A social planner constrained by the same search frictions as private agents only has to decide
which transition opportunities to take up and which ones to ignore. Recall that opportunities
to move from unemployment to employment or from job-to-job only arise infrequently due to
search frictions, while the option to move workers into unemployment is always available.6
6. Because the planner solution is mostly a benchmark to assist equilibrium analysis, which is our main focus, here
we assume that productivity is always large enough, relative to the value of leisure, that the planner will not forgo any
opportunity to move an unemployed worker into employment. So we concentrate on the optimal allocation of workers
through on-the-job search.
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The constrained efficient allocation is then simple enough to characterize: the planner will
take up any opportunity to move an unemployed worker into employment, and the unemployment
rate evolves according to ut+1 =δt+1(1−ut)+
(
1−λt+1
)
ut . Moreover, the planner always seeks
to move employed workers from less productive towards more productive firms. This induces
the following simple process for the measure L	t (p) of workers efficiently allocated to a typical
type-p firm:
L	t+1(p)=L	t (p)
(
1−δt+1
)(
1−sλt+1(p)
)+λt+1ut +sλt+1(1−δt+1)N	t (p), (1)
where
N	t (p)=
∫ p
p
L	t (x)γ (x)dx.
Given new aggregate state ωt+1, which determines δt+1 and λt+1, of the L	t (p) workers initially
employed by this firm, a fraction
(
1−δt+1
)
are not separated exogenously into unemployment.
Of these survivors, a fraction sλt+1 receive an opportunity to move to another firm. The planner
exercises that option if and only if the new firm is more productive than p, which is the case with
probability (p) :=1−(p). The initially unemployed ut find jobs with chance λt+1. Workers
employed at other firms who have not lost their jobs draw with chance sλt+1 an opportunity to
move to the type-p firm, that the planner exploits if and only if the firm they currently work at
has productivity x<p. The measure of such workers in the optimal plan is N	t (p).
Equation (1) combines an ordinary differential equation and a first-order difference equation
in N	t (p), a function of time t and p. Multiplying through by γ (p) in (1) and integrating with
respect to p yields:
N	t+1(p)=λt+1ut(p)+
(
1−δt+1
)(
1−sλt+1(p)
)
N	t (p).
For any given initial condition N	0 (p)=N0(p) at some (renormalized) initial date 0 such that the
aggregate state last switched to ω at time 0 and then remained at ω between 0 and t, the latter law
of motion is a first-order difference equation which solves as
N	t (p)=
[
(1−δ0)
(
1−sλ0(p)
)]t N0(p)+λ0(p) t∑
τ=1
[
(1−δ0)
(
1−sλ0(p)
)]τ−1
ut−τ . (2)
By inspection, N	t (p) is differentiable in p at all dates t, and one obtains a closed-form expression
for the workforce of any type-p firm:
L	t (p)=
dN	t (p)/dp
γ (p)
=(1−δ0)t
(
1−sλ0(p)
)t−1[(1−sλ0(p))L	0 (p)+tsλ0N0(p)]
+λ0
{
ut−1+
t∑
τ=2
(1−δ0)τ−1
(
1−sλ0(p)
)τ−2[1−sλ0+sλ0τ(p)]ut−τ
}
, (3)
where L	0 (p) was the value of this solution under state ω̂0 at the time of the last state switch from
ω̂0 to the current ω.
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If the aggregate productivity state forever stays at ω, so that transition rates δ and λ are constant
over time, the solutions to (2) and (3) converge to
N	∞(p)=
δλ
δ+λ ·
(p)
1−(1−δ)(1−sλ(p))
and L	∞(p)=
δλ
δ+λ ·
1−(1−δ)(1−sλ)[
1−(1−δ)(1−sλ(p))]2 ,
(4)
which are the familiar steady-state expressions found in the BM model. As is well known and
immediately verifiable from (4), the (normalized) distribution of employment across firm types
L	∞(p)/N	∞(p¯) is increasing in λ and decreasing in δ in the sense of stochastic dominance.
Intuitively, workers upgrade to higher-p firms in larger numbers if they receive more opportunities
to do so (higher sλ) or if they get thrown off the job ladder into unemployment less often (lower δ).
This comparative statics property is reflected in the dynamic behaviour of the firm size distribution
if we assume, as is consistent with empirical evidence on job-to-job quits and job separations,
that λ(ω) is increasing and δ(ω) decreasing in the state of aggregate productivity ω, and also
that more productive firms initially employ more workers, as is suggested by empirical evidence
on the size-productivity relationship (and as is necessarily the case in the model’s steady state).
Then, hitting the economy with a randomly drawn sequence of aggregate shocks, in Moscarini
and Postel-Vinay (2010a, MPV10a) we find that large employers are more cyclically sensitive,
because they gain workers faster over an aggregate expansion as job upgrading accelerates,
and vice versa in a slump. This property of the efficient allocation replicates the new empirical
evidence that we document in MPV12.
5. EQUILIBRIUM
5.1. Definition
Each firm chooses and commits to an employment contract, namely a state-contingent wage
depending on some state variable, to maximize the present discounted value of profits, given
other firms’contract offers. The firm is further subjected to an equal treatment constraint, whereby
it must pay the same wage to all its workers. This is the sense in which we generalize the BM
restrictions placed on the set of feasible wage contracts to a non-steady-state environment.7 Under
commitment, such a wage function implies a value V for any worker to work for that firm. For
reasons that will become clear shortly, we assume that a contract offered by a firm to its workers
is observable only by the parties involved.8
Let H be the (Borel-)measurable set of all histories of play in the game, and VH the set of
measurable functions H×
[
p,p
]
→R. A behaviour strategy of the contract-posting game is a
7. We thus rule out, beyond contracts that condition wages on tenure (Burdett and Coles, 2003) and employment
status (Carrillo-Tudela, 2009), also offer-matching and individual bargaining (Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002; Dey and
Flinn, 2005; Cahuc et al., 2006). Note, however, that the model can be generalized to allow for time-varying individual
heterogeneity under the assumption that firms offer the type of piece-rate contracts described in Barlevy (2008). In that
sense experience and/or tenure effects can be introduced into the model.
8. More specifically, we assume that offered contracts are not publicly observable, but, in order to sustain
commitment by the firm, contracts must be privately verifiable by a third party such as a court if the worker decides
to make it so (e.g. the firm states the compensation policy in a letter that the worker retains). Alternatively, we can
assume that the contract is observable only to other workers at the same firm, in which case the source of commitment is
reputation, as in Coles (2001). What matters is that a contract is not observable by other firms, who could use a publicly
observable deviation to coordinate play. We thank a referee for pointing this out to us.
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function V ∈VH such that, when the history of past play in the game at time t is ht ∈H, each firm
p∈
[
p,p
]
offers value Vt (p)=V
(
ht,p
)
to all of its workers.9
As V is measurable, we can define the c.d.f. of offered values,
Ft (W) :=
∫ p
p
I{Vt (p)≤W}d(p), (5)
for every ht ∈H, W ∈R, and where I is the indicator function. This is the fraction of firms that
offer a value no greater than W , given history ht and given that all firms follow strategy V . This
is also the chance that a worker who receives a job offer draws a value no higher than W . Let
Ft =1−Ft denote the survival function.
Let Nt (p) be the measure of workers currently employed at all firms of productivity up to p,
so Nt (p) is total employment, both on the equilibrium path. For any history of play ht ∈H, the
c.d.f. of earned values,
Gt (W) := 1Nt (p) ·
∫ p
p
I{Vt (p)≤W}dNt (p), (6)
is also well-defined. This is the probability that a randomly drawn worker is currently earning
value no greater than W after history ht . Due to aggregate shocks, which affect both the offered
values directly and the distribution of employment Nt through turnover rates, the distributions Ft
and Gt are themselves stochastic.
Given a strategy V ∈VH followed by all firms and the resulting distribution of offers Ft , an
unemployed worker earns a value Ut solving:
Ut =bt +βEt
[(
1−λt+1
)
Ut+1+λt+1
∫
max
〈
v,Ut+1
〉
dFt+1(v)
]
, (7)
where the expectation is taken over the new state, conditional on the current history ht (hence the
time subscript in the expectation operator). The new state determines the stochastic contact rate
λt+1, offer distribution Ft+1, and continuation value of unemployment Ut+1. The unemployed
worker collects a flow value bt and, next period, when aggregate productivity becomes ωt+1, she
draws with chance λt+1 =λ
(
ωt+1
)
a job offer from the distribution of offered values Ft+1, that
she accepts if its value exceeds that of staying unemployed.
A firm that observes state ωt+1 and decides to post a continuation value Wt+1 ≤Ut+1 loses all
workers, who quit to unemployment, so Lt+1 =0. Otherwise, by the Law of Large Numbers,10
the size Lt of a firm which posts a value Wt+1 >Ut+1 changes to
Lt+1 =Lt
(
1−δt+1
)[
1−sλt+1Ft+1
(
Wt+1
)]+λt+1[1−Nt (p)]
+sλt+1
(
1−δt+1
)
Nt (p)Gt+1
(
Wt+1
)
.
(8)
9. To simplify notation, a time superscript on a variable denotes its entire history to date, while a time subscript
denotes its current value given the current state of aggregate productivity ω and history to date. Every variable dated t+1
has to be interpreted at time t as a random variable, with randomness generated by the evolution of the aggregate state
and by history of play between t and t+1. We make dependence of the various value and policy functions on the relevant
states explicit again in the Appendix, which contains the proofs of our main results.
10. The exogenous separation of worker i∈ [0,Lt] is a Bernoulli random variable (i) equal to 1 with probability δt
and to 0 with probability 1−δt . Total separations equal the sum of the realizations of these Bernoulli events,
∫ Lt
0 (i)di. By
assumption, (i) and (j) are independent for any two workers i,j, have common mean δt and finite variance δt (1−δt).
By the Law of Large Numbers for a continuum of random variables in Uhlig (1996), Theorem 2, this integral equals δtLt
a.s. Similarly for hires from unemployment and from other firms.
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After the new aggregate state ωt+1 is realized, of the measure Lt of workers currently employed
by this firm, a fraction δt+1 =δ
(
ωt+1
)
are separated exogenously into unemployment. Of the(
1−δt+1
)
fraction of survivors, a fraction sλt+1Ft+1
(
Wt+1
)
quit because they draw from Ft+1
an outside offer which gives them a value larger than Wt+1. The currently unemployed 1−Nt (p)
find jobs with chance λt+1 =λ
(
ωt+1
)
, and accept an offer Wt+1 >Ut+1 from this firm. By random
matching, each firm offering Wt+1 >Ut+1 receives an inflow of workers from unemployment that
is independent of Wt+1, and is equal for all firms due to the normalization to uniform sampling
weights. The employed who have not lost their jobs (1−δt+1)Nt (p) receive an offer with chance
sλt+1, and accept it if the value Wt+1 they draw is larger than what they are already earning
(probability Gt+1
(
Wt+1
)), in which case they quit to this firm offering Wt+1.
Let Lt (p) be the size of a firm of productivity p on the equilibrium path, which follows:
Lt+1(p)=Lt (p)
(
1−δt+1
)[
1−sλt+1Ft+1
(
Vt+1(p)
)]+λt+1[1−Nt (p)]
+sλt+1
(
1−δt+1
)
Nt (p)Gt+1
(
Vt+1(p)
) (9)
so that
Nt (p)=
∫ p
p
Lt (x)γ (x)dx. (10)
The support of Nt is contained in that of firm types (of ), because no worker can be at a firm of
type p if no such firm exists.
A value strategy W ∈VH is implemented by a wage strategy w∈VH such that the worker’s
Bellman equation is solved by W given that all other firms play V : the worker receives the wage
and, next period, the expected value of being either displaced, or retained at the same firm, or
poached by a higher paying firm.
Wt =wt +βEt
[
δt+1Ut+1+
(
1−δt+1
)
Wt+1+
(
1−δt+1
)
sλt+1
∫ +∞
Wt+1
(
v−Wt+1
)
dFt+1(v)
]
.
(11)
Workers act sequentially, as they are always free to quit. Firms choose once and for all at time
0 a strategy V (a state-contingent value policy), and commit to it. The constraint of delivering
the promised value to the workers, once hired, is binding because, after hiring a worker with a
promise of Wt+1, the firm would like to renege and to squeeze the worker against the participation
constraint Wt+1 =Ut+1.
Our assumption that a contract offer is only observed by the firm and by the workers who
receive it implies that any deviation by a firm to a different pre-committed contract will be
observed at most by the workers that the firm will hire over the countable infinite horizon, and
by the firms that will hire workers who worked in the past at the deviating firm. Both sets
have measure zero. So the firm anticipates that any deviation will trigger no relevant change in
other firms’ behaviour, and, when choosing its strategy, takes the distributions of offers Ft and
earned contracts Gt as given at any future point in time and state. The economy is always on
the equilibrium path, independently of individual deviations, and we only need to check that the
latter are not profitable.
Our first task is to find the state space on which equilibrium strategies can be conditioned. By
assumption, past play by other firms is unobservable, hence cannot be part of H. By inspecting the
equations, the strategically relevant history for a firm of type p is ht ={ω0,··· ,ωt,t,Lt−1}. Given
initial conditions and a strategy V , knowing the value of this ht is enough to compute the entire
history of play by all firms to date t. The history of aggregate productivity ωt−1 :={ωs}s≤t−1
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is directly payoff-relevant at t only insofar as it determines the size distribution Nt−1, thus the
value distribution Gt−1 through (6). But ωt−1 can also be used by firms as a public randomization
device to coordinate actions, hence Nt−1 is not sufficient for ωt−1 in a strategic sense. Note that
the relevant history ht on which firms can condition their choices at time t includes ωt and Lt−1
but not Lt , because according to the timing we assumed current firm size Lt is determined by the
value offered at time t, which depends on ht .11
The equilibrium strategy V is a fixed point: if all firms pre-commit at time 0 to the value offer
strategy V , a function of the history of play ht , and workers act optimally at all points in time t,
given the implied evolution of the cross-section distributions of values offered Ft and earned Gt
and of the value of unemployment Ut , each firm’s best response to maximize expected discounted
profits at time 0 is to follow the same strategy V .
To further reduce the state space to a tractable dimensionality, we restrict attention to strategies
that depend only on current values of payoff-relevant variables, namely own productivity p, own
firm size Lt−1, the new state of aggregate productivity ωt , and distribution of employment Nt−1.
This restriction is in the spirit of Maskin and Tirole (2001)’s Markov Perfect Equilibrium, although
that is defined for games of observable actions without commitment. Importantly, this restriction
excludes calendar time, because not payoff-relevant, from the state space. In this sense, our
Markov strategies are “stationary”.
Definition 1. A Markov contract-posting equilibrium is a measurable function V of own
productivity p, own size Lt−1, the new state of aggregate productivity ωt , and distribution of
employment Nt−1, with the following property: for every firm type p, if all other firms of type
x play V, so that (5), (6) and (9) hold with Vt (x)=V
(
x,Lt−1(x),ωt,Nt−1
)
, the wage function
that implements V (i.e. solves (11) with Wt =Vt (p)) also maximizes firm p’s expected present
discounted value of profits at time 0.
Note that the Markov state variable contains only one endogenous (to the firm) state variable,
its own size Lt−1, the rest being either a fixed parameter p or aggregate states, ωt and Nt−1, that
are independent of any individual firm’s behaviour, both on and off the equilibrium path. Making
strategies independent of past values of aggregate productivity comes at the cost of introducing
in the state the distribution of employment Nt−1. This is also an infinitely dimensional object,
but it turns out to be much more tractable than the entire history of ωt , as we will see next.
5.2. The firm’s contract-posting problem
We fix the Markov strategy of other firms V and omit it from the notation for simplicity. The firm
can always guarantee itself zero flow profits by making the participation constraint Wt ≥Ut bind
and dismissing all workers, so offering any value lower than Ut is equivalent to an offer Wt =Ut
which guarantees zero output and flow profits this period.
The firm maximizes, under commitment, the expected present discounted value of profits
at time 0, 0. The problem can be formulated recursively (Spear and Srivastava, 1987) by
introducing an additional, fictitious state variable, namely the continuation utility V that the firm
promised at time t−1 to deliver to the worker from this period t on. While we subsume all
11. Under this definition, part of ht , specifically firm size Lt , is not publicly observed. When maximizing, each
firm believes that other firms offer values according to the strategy evaluated at the the publicly observed history of
aggregate productivity, ωt , and their own size on the equilibrium path, Lt (p), which the firm can calculate only based
on known initial conditions and ωt . As mentioned, when optimizing, each firm correctly believes that, irrespective of its
own choices, the rest of the economy is always on the equilibrium path. The question is what is this path.
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other state variables {p,Lt,ωt,Nt} in the time index of the firm’s value/objective t ,12 we make
the dependence of these profits on promised value V explicit, because of its central strategic
importance. So the firm solves
t
(
V
)= sup
wt,Wt+1≥Ut+1
〈
(ωtp−wt)Lt +βEt
[
t+1
(
Wt+1
)]〉 (12)
subject to a Promise-Keeping (PK) constraint to deliver the promised V :
V =wt +βEt
[
δt+1Ut+1+
(
1−δt+1
)(
1−sλt+1Ft+1
(
Wt+1
))
Wt+1
+(1−δt+1)sλt+1∫ +∞
Wt+1
vdFt+1(v)
]
.
(13)
The expectations are taken with respect to the future realization ωt+1 of aggregate productivity
conditional on the date-t state variable, while firm size Lt evolves according to (8), cumulated
firm size Nt follows (10).
The continuation value on the RHS of (13) comes from (11) after a small algebraic
manipulation. In (12), given the timing of events, the firm collects flow revenues, equal to per
worker productivity ωtp times firm size Lt , then chooses and pays the flow wage wt to each worker,
then observes the new state of aggregate productivity ωt+1, and finally chooses the continuation
contract (promised value) Wt+1, so that wage and continuation values deliver to the workers the
current promised value V , in expectation, as per (13).
To characterize the best-response contract, we first describe an equivalent unconstrained
recursive formulation of the contract-posting problem. We define the joint value of the firm
and its existing workers:
St =t +VLt .
Solving for the wage wt from (13) and replacing it into the firm’s Bellman equation (12) we see
that the joint value function St solves:
St =ωtpLt +βEt
[
δt+1Ut+1Lt
]+βEt[ sup
Wt+1≥Ut+1
〈(
1−δt+1
)
sλt+1Lt
∫ +∞
Wt+1
vdFt+1(v)
+St+1−Wt+1
{
λt+1(1−Nt (p))+
(
1−δt+1
)
sλt+1Nt (p)Gt+1
(
Wt+1
)}〉] (14)
again subject to (8) and (10).13 The joint value St to the firm and its existing workers equals the
total flow output, ωtpLt , plus the expected discounted continuation value. This includes (in order)
the value of unemployment for those workers who are displaced exogenously, the value of a new
12. Note that, given our assumed timing, the continuation value that the firm chooses to offer to the worker depends
on {p,Lt,ωt+1,Nt} because the firm observes ωt+1 before quantifying the promised continuation value. But the present
discounted value of profits of the firm at the beginning of time t, t , is a function of the different state {p,Lt,ωt,Nt},
because ωt+1 is not known at the beginning of the period, when paying the wage wt . So {p,Lt,ωt+1,Nt} is the strategically
relevant state variable, the argument of the optimal policy function, which determines the offered value, and {p,Lt,ωt,Nt}
is the state variable of the firm’s optimization problem, the argument of the firm’s value (profit) function.
13. A detailed proof of this claim is available in Section 1 of the Supplementary Material to this article.
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job for those workers who are not displaced and find a better offer than the one extended by the
current firm and, on the second line of (14), the joint continuation value of the firm and of its
current (time t) workers. In turn, the latter equals the joint continuation value St+1 of the firm and
its future workforce—made up of stayers among the current (date-t) workforce plus next period
(date-t+1) hires—minus the value to be paid to new hires, either from unemployment or from
other firms (respectively, the two terms in curly brackets in the second line of (14)). If we did not
subtract this cost of employing new hires, this Bellman equation would generate the joint value
of the firm and all of its workers, current and future. In this case, the firm would optimally offer
its workers the maximum value, namely pay a wage equal to productivity (the proof, omitted, is
available upon request). As is standard, the efficient solution to a moral hazard problem is to “sell
the firm to the workers”. In our economy, however, firms do not pursue efficiency, but maximize
profits. Therefore, the optimal value-offer policy is an interior solution.
Crucially, the current promised value V does not appear in (14), either directly or in the law
of motion of transition rates λt+1, δt+1, firm size Lt+1, and value distributions Ft+1, Gt+1. So
the DP problem in (14) and its solution are independent of V . Along the optimal path, the level
of current promised utility V only affects the distribution of payoffs between the firm and its
existing workers, not its overall level St , nor the choice of tomorrow’s promised values Wt+1.
The intuition is clear. The workers’ turnover decisions only depend on continuation values Wt+1
promised by the firm, so the same applies to firm continuation profits t+1. The firm thus offers
state-contingent Wt+1 to maximize t+1 independently of the currently promised value V . Then,
to deliver V as promised without distorting the optimally set future turnover, the firm adjusts the
current wage wt .
An issue arises with the initially promised value, before the firm chooses and commits to
the contract at time 0. If the firm has some employees at time 0 and all the bargaining power, it
optimally pays the lowest possible wage and extracts all rents from its initial workforce, by making
them just indifferent between staying or quitting into unemployment through an offered value
U0 =U (ω0,N0). It cannot be always optimal, however, to pre-commit to offer again the same
value of unemployment U0 in the future, whenever the state of the firm returns to {p,L0,ω0,N0},
because that offer would maximize attrition, and in general the firm is willing to pay extra to retain
more workers. So the best response by any firm in this state {p,L0,ω0,N0} is different at time 0 and
at a later date, thus is time-dependent, or non-Markovian. This is true even if all other firms offer
Markov contracts. Hence, if the firm has both employees before it has committed to the contracts
and all the bargaining power, a Markov contract-posting equilibrium may not exist. This, however,
turns out to be a technical issue of little economic substance, with multiple possible and equivalent
resolutions. Assume all other firms offer a Markov contract. Then, as just shown, at each time
t =1,2... the best-response value that the firm promises in each state next period does not depend
on the current value promised to its workers, inherited from commitment in the previous period
t−1. By induction, the best-response value that the firm promises at each future date and state
does not depend on the value earned by its initial employees L0; i.e. continuation play does not
depend on the initial rent-sharing at time 0. Therefore, we can calculate a Markov best response
from time t =1 by solving (14) and ignoring the time-0 problem. Then, we can fix arbitrarily
the value paid to initial employees, subject to participation constraints of all parties. Just as one
example, we can assume that initial workers bargain with the firm over the initial value, and each
of them obtains exactly the same value V0(p) that the firm promises to deliver if the state returns
later to the initial one {p,L0,ω0,N0}, so that the whole best response to a Markov contract is itself
Markov. The continuation contract promised in each state from time t =1 on, thus the equilibrium
predictions of the model, are unaffected by this initial choice, so we do not delve into it.
The optimal policy solving the unconstrained DP problem (14) also solves (12) subject to
(13). We therefore focus on the analysis of the simpler problem (14). An equilibrium is a fixed
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point, a solution V to this DP problem that coincides with the strategy followed by the other firms.
To find the equilibrium, we proceed as follows. First, we show that the equilibrium distribution of
values offered (F) and earned (G), whatever they are, must be atomless on a connected support.
Next, a best-response value to any strategy followed by all other firms must be strictly increasing
in own productivity p and size L. Finally, under certain sufficient conditions, in that smaller set
of monotonic functions we construct the unique equilibrium.
5.3. Properties of the equilibrium distributions of contracts
The distributions of offered and accepted worker values, Ft and Gt , must satisfy certain
general properties in equilibrium, which parallel similar properties of the corresponding wage
distributions in the original BM model.
Proposition 1 (Ft and Gt are atomless). In equilibrium Ft and Gt are atomless at all dates t
and in all states, with their common support being compact and convex.
To see why there can be no atom in either Ft or Gt , observe that, by the equal treatment
constraint, if Ft had an atom at some value Wt , then so would Gt . But an atom in Gt would open
the way to a profitable deviation, as in BM. A firm that is part of the atom that offers the same
Wt could marginally raise the wage wt and leave the continuation value unchanged, increase the
chance of beating at time t−1 all competitors who offer Wt , and thus poach at t−1 an additional
measure of workers at a negligible marginal cost. This deviation is unprofitable only if the firm
was already offering its workers so much as to break even in expected present discounted terms.
But then a more drastic deviation towards offering, e.g. Wt =Ut in all states is profitable as all
unemployed workers accept this offer and stay for a while, generating strictly positive profits for
all but the zero measure of firms with marginal productivity type that break even with Wt =Ut .
To see why the support of Ft and Gt is convex, observe that if there was a gap then the lower
and upper bounds of this gap would generate the same hiring and retention, so the same firm size,
but the upper bound would cost the firm more in terms of wages, so no firm would post such an
upper bound. To see why the support is compact, observe that W =ωp/(1−β) is a natural upper
bound to the offered value, with ω the upper bound of : the firm can always do weakly better by
offering less than W , as it can hope to make some profits. So the support is a convex and bounded
subset of R+, which we can therefore take to be compact without loss in generality.
5.4. Rank-Preserving Equilibrium
While solving for equilibrium directly is an intractable problem because the size distribution of
firms Nt is an infinitely dimensional state variable, we can still define a tractable and natural class
of equilibria, which have the following property. Recall that Lt (p) denotes employment size of
a type-p firm along the equilibrium path, i.e. the size attained by that firm given the initial size
distribution at date 0 and given that all firms have played the equilibrium strategy from date 0 up
to the current date t. Then:
Definition 2. A Rank-Preserving Equilibrium (RPE) is a Markov equilibrium V where, on the
equilibrium path, a more productive firm always offers its workers a higher continuation value:
Vt+1(p)=V
(
p,Lt (p),ωt+1,Nt
)
is increasing in p, including the effect of p on current firm size
Lt (p).
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As a direct consequence of the above definition, in a RPE, workers rank their preferences to
work for different firms according to firm productivity at all dates. The following two properties
thus hold true in any RPE: the proportion of firms that offer less than Vt+1(p) is simply the
proportion of firms that are less productive than p,
Ft (Vt (p))≡(p), (15)
and the fraction of employed workers who earn a value that is lower than that offered by p equals
the share of employment at firms less productive than p:
Gt (Vt (p))= Nt−1(p)Nt−1(p) . (16)
As we will see, these restrictions will drastically simplify the computation of equilibrium in
the stochastic model. Moreover, the RP property is theoretically appealing for at least two more
reasons. First, it parallels a well-known property of the unique static equilibrium characterized by
BM, which is that workers rank firms according to productivity. Second, RPE feature constrained-
efficient labour reallocation at all dates: if workers consistently rank more productive firms higher
than less productive ones, then job-to-job moves will always be up the productivity ladder. That
is, if the value of leisure bt is small enough, the unique RPE allocation is Lt (p)=L	t (p) and
Nt (p)=N	t (p) at all points in time and states.
It is therefore natural to ask how general Rank-Preserving Equilibria are. We now show that
under a sufficient condition on the initial size distribution of employment, all Markov equilibria
must be Rank-Preserving. Because the employment allocation in a RPE is constrained efficient,
it is also unique. This is the central result of the article. It builds on the following, key technical
result.
Proposition 2 (Increasing best response). For any Markov strategy played by other firms, i.e.
for any map V from payoff-relevant states (p,Lt,ωt+1,Nt) to continuation values offered to
workers, the best response of a given firm is Markov and increasing in the firm’s productivity p
and size Lt.
As a Markov equilibrium strategy is a best response to itself, it must share the same
monotonicity properties. Although its proof, in Section A of the Appendix, is technically quite
involved, Proposition 2 has a simple economic intuition, which extends the logic of BM’s steady-
state model to our dynamic setting. Consider the first statement: offered values are increasing in
firm productivity p. In BM, more productive firms offer higher wages due to a single-crossing
property of their steady-state profits, which in turn reflects two very basic economic forces. First,
a higher wage implies a larger firm size, as a more generous offer makes it easier to poach workers
and to fend off competition. Second, a larger firm size is more valuable to a more productive
firm, because each worker produces more. Therefore, by a simple monotone comparative statics
argument, it must be the case that more productive firms offer more, employ more workers, and
earn higher profits. Simply put, a more productive firm can afford paying more, and is willing to
do so to attract workers, because its opportunity cost of not producing is higher.
The intuition for the second statement of Proposition 2, that offered continuation values are
increasing in current size, is slightly more involved, and can be clarified in a simple two-period,
deterministic version of the model. Let F denote the distribution of second-period wages, rather
than values, assumed to be differentiable for simplicity, with F′= f . Consider a firm inheriting a
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 workforce size of L0, who have been promised today a continuation value
V0 =w0+β
[
δU1+(1−δ)
(
1−sλF(w1)
)
w1+(1−δ)sλ
∫ +∞
w1
wdF(w)
]
. (17)
Solve this PK constraint for the initial wage w0(w1) as a function of the future wage w1, given
promised utility V0. The firm chooses the wage w1 to maximize the PDV of profits
(w1)= [p−w0(w1)]L0+β(p−w1)L1(w1),
where next period’s size is L1(w1)=
[
(1−δ)(1−sλF(w1))L0+H (w1)] and H (w1) is the flow
of hires from unemployment and from other firms (we keep this implicit). The marginal impact
on profits of varying the future wage decomposes into three terms:
′(w1)=−dw0dw1 L0−βL1(w1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Wage-bill effect
+β(p−w1)sλf (w1)L0︸ ︷︷ ︸
Retention effect
+β(p−w1)H ′(w1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Recruitment effect
.
The last two effects are intuitive: by raising the wage, the firm retains more of its existing workers,
an effect that is larger the bigger the firm to begin with, and attracts more workers, to an extent
that does not depend on its current size. The wage-bill effect is less obvious. Raising the period-1
wage promise allows to reduce the period-0 wage by (dw0/dw1) on the L0 workers, and still
deliver V0, but costs βL1(w1) in present value, as future workers L1 (survivors from period 0
plus new hires H (w1)), will be paid more. Using (17) to calculate (dw0/dw1) and the expression
for L1(w), the wage-bill effect is independent of initial size and equals:
β(1−δ)(1−sλF(w1))L0−β [(1−δ)(1−sλF(w1))L0+H (w1)]=−βH (w1).
The intertemporal MRS between wages is exactly the same for the firm and for any worker in
its period-0 workforce, namely, the discount factor β times the probability (1−δ)(1−sλF(w1))
that the worker will be around to collect a higher payment. So firms are indifferent about the
timing of wages paid to deliver a certain promised utility to their initial workforce. The only
(and negative) effect of a higher future promised wage on the wage bill is for new hires, whose
measure is independent of initial size. So, overall, only the retention effect depends, positively,
on initial size, and (d2)/(dw1dL0)>0: the profit function is supermodular in initial size and
future wage, so that initially larger firms offer higher future wages. Because the marginal trade-
off between today’s wages and tomorrow’s promised values does not depend on the level of the
current promised value, this reasoning extends to the infinite horizon model with uncertainty. In
the proof of Proposition 2, we formalize this intuition, to establish single-crossing properties of
the maximand in the Bellman equation of the value-posting problem (14),14 which parallel the
single-crossing property of steady-state profits in BM.
Translating this property of the best response into equilibrium characterization requires an
extra induction step. In BM’s stationary setup, firm size is an endogenous object, and BM look
for an appropriate firm size distribution which guarantees a stationary allocation. In our dynamic
model, firm size is a state variable, and its initial value is a parameter of the model, arbitrarily fixed,
14. In a way similar to that in which Caputo (2003) appeals to single-crossing properties of the Hamiltonian in his
analysis of comparative dynamics for deterministic optimal control problems.
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not an endogenous object. Therefore, in order to get a start on monotone comparative dynamics,
it is sufficient (but not necessary) that the initial size distribution shares the key property of BM’s
steady-state distribution; namely, it is weakly increasing in productivity.
To understand how restrictive these sufficient conditions are, consider first the case of
completely homogeneous firms: they have the same productivity p ( is degenerate) and same
initial size. By Proposition 1, in equilibrium firms must randomize on the value offered at time
t =0. Firms that draw and offer a larger value pay higher wages but grow larger. By Proposition 2,
from then on they pay a larger value, grow larger, and so on forever. So any Markov equilibrium
is necessarily Rank-Preserving.
Next, assume that firms differ in their productivity but have the same initial size; e.g. they all
start empty. Then by Proposition 1 the more productive firms initially offer their workers a larger
value, grow larger, thus in the following period again offer a larger value, and so on forever.
Again, any Markov equilibrium is necessarily Rank-Preserving.
Finally, if firms differ both in their productivity and in their initial size, then for RPE it suffices
that more productive firms start out larger. This is the only genuine restriction for a RPE, and is
sufficient, but not necessary. It aligns two separate motives to pay workers more, firm productivity
and size, so there is some slack. The same induction logic applies.
We have proven the following:
Proposition 3 (Ranked initial firm size implies RPE). Any Markov contract-posting Equi-
librium is necessarily Rank-Preserving, and the ranking of firms’ sizes is maintained on the
equilibrium path, if either of the following two conditions is verified:
(1) firms have the same productivity p ( is degenerate); or
(2) firms differ in their productivity p ( has a continuous density), and more productive firms
are initially weakly larger (L0(p) is non-decreasing in p).
We stress that this is a characterization result, which neither establishes nor requires existence,
let alone uniqueness, of a RPE. While the RPE allocation is unique, the RPE strategy needs not
be unique. Our main result says that, if a Markov contract-posting Equilibrium V exists, then V
can only be a best response to itself if it is increasing in p, including the effect of endogenous size
on the posted value. So ours is a general monotonicity result, which does not require to either
propose or calculate a particular value-offer strategy. In the next section, we show by construction
existence and uniqueness of a RPE, which must then be the unique Markov equilibrium of the
contract-posting game.
To characterize a RPE we need to describe how allocation and prices depend on exogenous
states. The allocation is easy because constrained efficient. We already know from Section 4 how
the size of each firm evolves in equilibrium. Indeed, the same logic applies to any job ladder
model in which a similar concept of RPE can be defined. Nothing in the dynamics of L	t or N	t
depends on the particulars of the wage setting mechanism, so long as this is such that employed
job-seekers move from lower-ranking into higher ranking jobs in the sense of a time-invariant
ranking. Therefore, this model’s predictions about everything relating to firm sizes are in fact
much more general than the wage- (or value-) posting assumption retained in the BM model. We
now turn to supporting prices.
5.5. Existence and uniqueness of (Rank-Preserving) equilibrium
Our aim in this section is to characterize equilibrium contracts in a way that will provide a
constructive proof of uniqueness and—subject to a sufficient condition—of existence of RP
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equilibrium contracts. We begin by establishing some important properties of optimal contracts.
Equation (1) combined with the assumption that initial firm size, L0(p), is a continuous function
of p (see Section 3) ensures that L	t (p) is a continuous function of p at all dates t in a RPE. With
that in mind, we can establish the following additional properties of the joint value function St
and worker value function Vt in a RPE:
Proposition 4 (Differentiability of value functions in RPE). The following properties hold
in a RPE:
(1) the joint value S(p,L,ωt,N	t ) of a firm of type p and of its L current employees is convex
in L, differentiable in L at L=L	t (p), and such that p 	→ (∂S/∂L)
(
p,L	t (p),ωt,N	t
)
is
continuous.
(2) the value Vt (p)=V
(
p,L	t−1(p),ωt,N	t−1
)
offered by a firm of type p is continuously totally
differentiable in p.
The proof is in Section B of the Appendix. While most of that proof is essentially technical,
it begins by establishing continuity of Vt+1(p) in p, which follows from Proposition 1: a jump in
Vt+1(p) would create a gap in the support of Ft+1, which Proposition 1 rules out.
The second statement in Proposition 4 allows us to differentiate (15) and (16) w.r.t. p. For all
times t and states at time t:
ft (Vt (p)) dVtdp (p)=γ (p) and gt (Vt (p))
dVt
dp
(p)= L
	
t−1(p)
N	t−1(p)
γ (p). (18)
This differentiability property allows the use in (14) of first-order conditions:
λt+1
(
1−N	t (p)
)+sλt+1(1−δt+1)N	t (p)G(Wt+1)
=[SL (p,Lt+1,ωt+1,N	t+1)−Wt+1]
×(1−δt+1)sλt+1[L	t (p)ft+1(Wt+1)+N	t (p)gt+1(Wt+1)]−ξt+1,
(19)
where ξt is the Lagrange multiplier for the workers’ participation constraint Wt ≥Ut , and where
complementary slackness ξt (Wt −Ut)=0 applies at all t. In a RPE, (19) is solved by Wt+1 =
Vt+1(p)=V
(
p,L	t (p),ωt+1,N	t
)
.
Define the costate variable
μt (p) := ∂S
∂L
(
p,L	t (p),ωt,N
	
t
)
,
which measures the shadow value to the worker-firm collective of the marginal worker, given
the aggregate state, along the equilibrium path. Combining (19) and the various restrictions (15),
(16), and (18) that hold in a RPE, we obtain the RPE version of the NFOC (19):
λt+1ut +sλt+1
(
1−δt+1
)
N	t (p)=
[
μt+1(p)−Vt+1(p)
] 2sλt+1(1−δt+1)L	t (p)γ (p)
dVt+1/dp
−ξt . (20)
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Then writing the Envelope condition w.r.t. firm size in the firm’s problem (14), we obtain:
μt (p)=ωtp+βEt
[
δt+1Ut+1+
(
1−δt+1
)
sλt+1
∫ +∞
Wt+1
vdFt+1(v)
+μt+1(p)
(
1−δt+1
)(
1−sλt+1Ft+1
(
Wt+1
))]
=ωtp+βEt
[
δt+1Ut+1+
(
1−δt+1
)
sλt+1
∫ +∞
p
Vt+1(x)d(x)
+μt+1(p)
(
1−δt+1
)(
1−sλt+1(p)
)]
, (21)
where the second equality holds in RPE. Note from (21) that now the shadow marginal value μt (p)
of an employee only depends on the distribution of employment N	t through total employment in
all firms of productivity up to p, N	t (p) and the corresponding density L	t (p)γ (p). Both are scalars,
and the state reduces from
{
p,Lt,ωt+1,Nt
}
, which is infinite-dimensional due to the relevance of
the entire firm size distribution Nt , to the four-dimensional vector
(
p,Lt,ωt+1,N	t (p)
)
: in order
to make its decisions, firm p only needs to know the mass of employment at less productive firms
N	t (p) and not the entire size distribution N	t .
Equation (20) generalizes to a dynamic stochastic environment the NFOC in BM’s steady-state
model with heterogeneous firms. To see why, let
Ht+1(p) :=λt+1ut +sλt+1
(
1−δt+1
)
N	t (p) (22)
denote the flow of hires into a firm of type p after state ωt+1 is realized. For all firms in the market,
except possibly one, at which the worker participation constraint is slack, rearranging (20), we
can write it as
dVt+1(p)
dp
=[μt+1(p)−Vt+1(p)]2d logHt+1(p)dp . (23)
Optimality demands that the additional value offered by firm p over its immediately lower
competitor equals the net returns from additional labour (costate minus offered value) times
the ratio between twice the marginal flow of hires when productivity p increases and the total
flow of hires. The marginal flow is doubled because a higher productivity, thus a higher offered
value, reduces attrition to other firms and also increases poaching from other firms, and the two
effects are locally equal, and add up. In steady state, under a constant aggregate state ω, the
shadow value of a marginal worker in (23) is simply the present value of a constant output flow
of ωp over the infinite future discounted with factor β(1−δ)(1−sλ(p)) (the agents’ discount
factor β times the survival probability of the match), the offered value is the present value of
a constant wage w(p) discounted with that same factor, and the flow of hires equals firm size
times the total separation rate. Using these facts, equation (23) reduces to the static NFOC (14)
in Bontemps et al. (2000).15
15. A detailed formal derivation of the equivalence between our model’s steady state and Bontemps et al.’s (2000)
model is available in Section 2 of the Supplementary Material to this article.
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Finally, a Transversality Condition (TVC) requires that the discounted joint value of the
marginal worker vanishes in expectation w.r.t. the stochastic path of ω
lim
t→∞E
[
β tμt (p)L	t (p) |L0,ω0,N0
]=0. (24)
The assumption bt ≥0 for all ωt guarantees that Ut ≥0, because a worker has always the
option of staying unemployed to collect positive payoffs. To guarantee existence of RPE, it
suffices to assume that s is large enough that the worker participation constraint never binds
in equilibrium.16 A RPE is then a value Vt increasing in p, a shadow value of employment μt ,
and a value of unemployment Ut positive and smaller than Vt , obeying the boundary condition
Vt
(
p
)
=Ut and solving the NFOC (20), the Euler equation (21) and the unemployment Bellman
equation (7) given the RPE employment dynamics (1), subject to the TVC (24).
We can easily solve the NFOC in its form (23), subject to the TVC (24), to find the RPE
offered value:17
Vt (p)=Ut + 1
Ht (p)2
∫ p
p
[μt (x)−Ut]· ddp
[
Ht (x)2
]
dx :=TV [μt,Ut](p |ωt),
where we make the dependence of the operator TV on ωt explicit to solve the system forward in
time. Define the following linear maps:
Tμ [μt,Ut](p |ωt) :=δtUt +μt (p)(1−δt)
(
1−sλt(p)
)+(1−δt)sλt∫ p
p
TV [μt,Ut](x |ωt)d(x)
TU [μt,Ut](ωt) :=(1−λt)Ut +λt
∫ p
p
TV [μt,Ut](x |ωt)d(x)
and collect them in the operator
T[μt,Ut](p |ωt)=
(
Tμ [μt,Ut](p |ωt)
TU [μt,Ut](ωt)
)
. (25)
Then a RPE is a
(μ	
U	
)
solving
(
μ	t
U	t
)
(p)=
(
ωtp
b(ωt)
)
+βEt
{
T
[
μ	t+1,U	t+1
](
p |ωt+1
)}
, (26)
16. Notice that when s is large enough, the worker has no reason to decline any offer, and with ωtp>bt even the
least productive firm can hire some unemployed workers and obtain positive profits. None of our previous results depend
on these restrictions. Our analysis allows for an occasionally binding participation constraint of the worker, hence for
entry and exit of firms “at the bottom” of the productivity distribution. We return to entry and exit in Section 7.
17. Again using (22), this expression can be related directly to the solution for the wage in Bontemps et al. (2000)
steady-state model, Equation (15), where the offered value is a capitalized constant wage, the flow of hires equals firm
size times the separation rate, and the costate simply equals productivity p.
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which satisfies the TVC (24) and has 0≤U	≤TV
[
μ	,U	
]≤μ	 and TV [μ	,U	](p) increasing
in p. We are now in a position to prove the following result:
Proposition 5 (Uniqueness and Existence). There exists at most one equilibrium, which is
Rank-Preserving. If it exists, the optimal contract in this unique RPE is the wage policy that pays
the worker a value TV
[
μ	,U	
]
where18
(
μ	t
U	t
)
(p) := lim
n→∞
n∑
j=0
β jEt
{
Tj [ωp,b(ω)](p |ωt+j)}. (27)
Existence is guaranteed under the sufficient condition ∀ω : ωp≥b(ω) and s[1−δ(ω)]≥1.
The proof, in Section C of the Appendix, simply proceeds through forward substitution and
induction, and establishes also that this limit exists. While we have not been able to derive
conditions on parameters that are both necessary and sufficient for equilibrium existence (i.e. for(
μ	,U	
)
to be a RPE), this is not an issue in applications. In fact, we proved that there is only
one possible equilibrium set of contracts, that we can compute (MPV10a) and then check ex post
whether in fact it satisfies all equilibrium conditions.
6. ENDOGENOUS JOB CREATION
6.1. Restating the firm’s problem
We have treated job-contact probabilities as exogenous, albeit state-dependent, objects. We now
consider the natural extension of our model consisting of endogenizing them through a matching
function.19 Specifically, we now assume that, each period, before workers have a chance to search,
a firm can post a≥0 job adverts (vacancies), or spend hiring effort a≥0, at a cost c(a), with c(·)
positive, strictly increasing and convex, continuously differentiable. Own hiring effort determines
the firm’s sampling weight in workers’ job search, while total hiring effort determines the rate
at which an advert returns contacts with workers. Specifically, consider a firm of current size Lt
posting a value Wt+1 ≥Ut+1 and at+1 adverts in aggregate state
(
ωt+1,Nt
)
. The analogue of (8)
characterizes that firm’s size in the following period:
Lt+1 =Lt
(
1−δt+1
)(
1−sλt+1Ft+1
(
Wt+1
))+ηt+1at+1Pt+1, (28)
where ηt is the rate at which adverts contact workers, λt is again the job contact rate, and
Pt+1 =
λt+1[1−Nt (p)]+sλt+1
(
1−δt+1
)
Nt (p)Gt+1
(
Wt+1
)
λt+1[1−Nt (p)]+sλt+1
(
1−δt+1
)
Nt (p)
(29)
is the chance that the offered value Wt+1 is acceptable to a random job-seeker who makes contact
with the adverts posted by this firm. In (29), the denominator is the measure of workers who make
contact, and the numerator counts only those who accept the offer, namely all the unemployed
and only the fraction of employed who will earn less than Wt+1 by staying where they are.
18. Note the slight abuse of notation in (27), where p is used both as notation for the function (ω,p) 	→ωp (itself
an argument of Tj in the r.h.s.), and as the argument of (μ	tU	t ) in the l.h.s. and of Tj [ωp,b(ω)] in the r.h.s.
19. We maintain the assumption of a exogenous, state-dependent job destruction rate, δt =δ(ωt).
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All contact rates are now endogenous and related trough an aggregate matching function, as
follows. First, let at (p) denote the adverts posted on the equilibrium path by a firm of productivity
p, size Lt−1(p), in aggregate state ωt,Nt−1, and define aggregate hiring effort At and aggregate
search effort by workers Yt as
At =
∫ p
p
at (p)d(p)
Yt =1−Nt−1(p)+s(1−δt)Nt−1(p)
(30)
the latter adding the previously unemployed to the previously employed who are not displaced
and draw a chance to search this period t. In each time period, employed and unemployed search
simultaneously. Then
ηtAt =λtYt =m(At,Yt), (31)
where m(·) is a constant-return-to-scale matching function, increasing and concave in both of its
arguments, and such that m(A,Y)≤min(A,Y). Finally, the distributions of offered and accepted
worker values, Ft and Gt , are defined as before—see (5) and (6)—except that firm sampling is
no longer uniform and each firm now has a sampling weight in F equal to its (normalized) hiring
effort, a/A. Thus Ft (Wt)= 1At
∫ p
p I{Vt (p)≤W}at (p)d(p).
As before, the best-response contract and hiring effort can be characterize as the solution to
the unconstrained, recursive maximization of the joint value of the firm-worker collective. That
problem, formally expressed in (14) in the exogenous-contact-rate case, now becomes:
St =ωtpLt +βEt
[
δt+1Ut+1Lt + sup
Wt+1≥Ut+1,at+1
〈
St+1−c
(
at+1
)
+(1−δt+1)sλt+1Lt∫ +∞
Wt+1
vdFt+1(v)−Wt+1ηt+1at+1Pt+1
〉] (32)
subject to (28), (29), (30), (31), as well as (7), (10) which are still valid.
In the next sub-section, we generalize Proposition 3, our main characterization result which
states that all Markov equilibria of our model labour market must be Rank-Preserving. Before we
do so, however, we note that Proposition 1, stating that Ft and Gt are atomless and have a common
compact and convex support still holds, as its proof applies verbatim to the new environment
considered in this section.
6.2. Rank-Preserving Equilibrium
Considering RPE, as defined in Definition 2, in our new environment, we see that, while Gt
continues to satisfy (16), the implied restriction on Ft needs to be amended to take the new
endogenous sampling weights into account. In a RPE:
Ft (Vt (p))= 1At
∫ p
p
at (x)d(x). (33)
The probability of drawing an offer worth Vt (p) or less is equal to the fraction of adverts posted
by firms of productivity p or less, a fraction which is now endogenous and responds to changes in
the firms’ and aggregate circumstances. Despite this complication, RPE still have the appealing
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property that, given the distribution of firm hiring effort, labour reallocation is efficient in the
sense that workers always move up the productivity ladder. Yet, while the direction of worker
turnover is efficient in RPE, its extent needs not be, because of standard externalities inherent in
the matching function.
The main result of this section is the following generalization of our main characterization
result to an environment with endogenous recruitment effort:
Proposition 6 (Ranked initial firm size implies RPE). Assume each firm controls hiring
effort a at convex cost c(a). Then Proposition 3 holds. Furthermore, in any RPE, more productive
firms spend more hiring effort: at (p)=a
(
p,Lt−1(p),ωt,Nt−1
)
is increasing in p.
The proof of Proposition 6 follows the same lines as that of Proposition 2 and is available
in Section 3 of the Supplementary Material. As before, a best-response offered value increasing
in own productivity p and size Lt then implies that any Markov equilibrium must be RP, under
appropriate initial conditions. Propositions 6 and 2-3 also share the same economic intuition. The
firm now has two tools at its disposal to recruit workers, promised value and hiring effort. The
proof of Proposition 6 establishes that the dynamic single-crossing property that we uncovered in
the value function of the optimal contract-posting problem implies that not only the value offered
to the worker, but also the intensity of hiring effort, increase with firm productivity and size. This
result only reinforces the mechanism that gives rise to RPE.
We now return to a major motivation of our exercise, namely MPV12’s facts. To explain them
in the extended model with endogenous hiring effort, we cannot appeal to the planner solution
as we did in the simpler model. Because of standard, and well-understood, congestion effects,
equilibrium hiring effort is not generally constrained efficient. So equilibrium turnover is efficient
in its direction—workers always move up the productivity ladder—but not necessarily in its pace.
The exogenous-contact-rate model, however, is a special case of the extended model. To see why,
choose a matching functions linear in aggregate search effort and an appropriate piece-wise linear
cost of hiring effort, both easily accommodated by our proofs. Then in RPE all firms will choose
to spend the same level of hiring effort that only depends on the level of aggregate productivity.
With a linear matching function, the contact rate is independent of unemployment, and we are
back to the previous model. Therefore, the extended model is flexible enough to be qualitatively
consistent with MPV12’s facts just like the simpler model, and quantitatively it can only do
better.
6.3. Further characterization of RPE with endogenous job creation
Before we conclude, let us re-emphasize that Proposition 6 is, just like Proposition 3, only a
characterization result, which neither requires nor proves existence or uniqueness of equilibrium.
We learn that, in order to understand the predictions of equilibrium for observed behaviour, we
need look no further than monotonic allocations, such that any firm’s offered value and hiring
effort are increasing in productivity and size. From an operational viewpoint, Proposition 6 also
provides the grounds on which to build a simulation algorithm for our model. We provide a sketch
in this sub-section: solving the resulting dynamic system is a difficult computational challenge,
which goes beyond the scope of this article, and we will tackle it in future research.
We establish in Section 3 of the Supplementary Material that the value offered to workers along
the RPE path, p 	→Vt (p) :=V
(
p,L	t−1(p),ωt,N	t−1
)
, is continuous in p, and that the joint value
St =S
(
p,L,ωt,N	t
)
of a firm of type p and of its L employees is differentiable in L along the RPE
path. The latter property allows us to define the costate variableμt (p)= (∂S/∂L)
(
p,L	(p),ωt,N	t
)
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as in the exogenous-contact-rate case, and to write the following Envelope condition w.r.t. firm 
size:
μt (p)=ωtp+βEt
[
δt+1Ut+1+
(
1−δt+1
)(
1− sλt+1
At+1
∫ p
p
at+1(x)d(x)
)
μt+1(p)
+(1−δt+1) sλt+1At+1
∫ p
p
at+1(x)Vt+1(x)d(x)
]
.
(34)
Next, we show in Section 3 of the Supplementary Material that, because Vt (p) is increasing,
thus a.e. differentiable, the same NFOC (23) as in the case of exogenous contact rates must hold
outside of a zero-measure set of values of p on the RPE path, with the flow of hires defined as
(22) but now with contact rate λt endogenized through a matching function and the new RPE
employment distribution Nt .20
Finally, the firm’s optimal choice of hiring effort implies a second NFOC:
c′(at (p))= [μt (p)−Vt (p)]· λtAt Ht (p). (35)
Together with the law of motion of employment, equations (34), (23), and (35) are the backbone
of a simulation algorithm, the principle of which is as follows:
(1) guess a path for at (p) for all t and p, increasing in p for each t;
(2) use the matching technology (30) and (31) to compute At and λt for all t;
(3) use the law of motion of employment (28)-(29), specialized to RPE using (16) and (33), to
compute Nt (p), and then use (22) to compute Ht (p), for all t and p;
(4) use (23), (34), and the Bellman equation for the value of unemployment21 to compute Vt (p),
μt (p), and Ut ;
(5) use (35) to update the guess for at (p).
7. DISCUSSION
7.1. Contracts
There is no unique way to generalize the steady-state BM model to an environment that is
subjected to aggregate shocks. Our proposed extension of BM’s model features contracts that
implement the efficient allocation (at given job contact rates) and generate equilibrium dynamics
that preserves all desirable properties from BM, but also explain MPV12’s facts. We now revisit
some of our assumptions, both to explore the robustness of our theoretical results and to prepare
the ground for future research.
While our proposed contracts are “general”22 within the bounds imposed by commitment and
the equal treatment constraint, the RP property also emerges in more restricted contract-posting
20. The slight loss compared to the exogenous-contact-rate case is that the NFOC for V now holds a.e., instead of
holding for all p∈
[
p,p
]
. The reason is that Vt (p) may not be everywhere differentiable.
21. Ut =b(ωt)+βEt
[
(1−λt+1)Ut+1 + λt+1At+1
∫ p
p at+1 (x)Vt+1 (x)d(x)
]
.
22. In the sense that they are conditioned on the largest possible state space consistent with fairly standard
assumptions about observability and the Markov requirement.
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games. For example, without equal treatment, by constant returns to scale in production the
firm treats each job independently of the others, as in the standard search-and-matching model,
and maximizes the profits that each job produces. Then, equilibrium contracts are simpler, size-
independent. The offered value does not determine the dynamics of firm size, but rather the
probability that the job is filled. Our proofs can be easily adapted to this special case, to establish
that offered values are increasing in firm productivity. Thus any Markov equilibrium is RP. In
this case, however, the model loses any meaningful notion of firm size: as just stated, without
equal treatment, there is nothing to tie up jobs together, and the distribution of employment into
‘firms’ of equal productivity p is irrelevant. (In equilibrium, of course, jobs with higher p will
offer more, and employ more workers in total, but the size–wage relationship will only result
from a correlation due to a common latent factor, productivity). Under equal treatment, a firm
is defined not only by its productivity p, but also by a wage policy. If a firm of type p deviates
and accumulates a different size than another firm of the same type p, then offered values will
differ between the two firms. Thus, the model yields a well-defined notion of firm size, and can
generate predictions about the cyclical dynamics of the firm size distribution, that we document
empirically in MPV12.
If we dispose of both the Markov and the equal treatment requirements, equilibrium contracts
under commitment are even simpler. As is standard, to solve the moral hazard problem of the
worker, who cannot commit not to accept outside offers, the firm maximizes the joint value
by ‘selling the job to the worker’, i.e. setting the wage equal to output after the first period, in
exchange for a very low, possibly negative, initial wage, or lump-sum transfer. Note, however, that
this moral hazard problem has additional ramifications in equilibrium: outside offers promise less
than their own expected discounted output (because of the initial low wage required to ‘buy’ the
firm), so transferring the whole output to the worker from the second period onward does not give
rise to efficient turnover. A worker, after ‘buying’a job and enjoying its full flow productivity, will
not be willing to quit and buy a new, slightly more productive job, because of the non-negligible
upfront cost. In this case, privately efficient contracts are socially inefficient.
Finally, while the assumption of commitment to state-contingent wages is standard in the
literature, where it is well-understood that commitment may both be beneficial to the firm and
sustainable in long-term employment relationships, that assumption could nonetheless be relaxed
in many different ways (e.g. the firm may be allowed a choice of whether or not commit to a
specific strategy as in Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2004, or it may only be committed to end-of-period
payments with an equal treatment constraint as in CM, or without), opening as many interesting
avenues for future research.
7.2. Entry, exit, and productivity shocks
The conditions for uniqueness and RP property of equilibrium are only sufficient and can therefore
be relaxed to an extent. However it is also possible to modify the economy so that those conditions
fail and our unique, efficient RPE breaks down. One of the key restrictions here is that we have
treated firm productivity as a fixed, time-invariant parameter. In turn, this allows for entry and
exit of firms only “at the bottom”, whereas the least productive firms may be temporarily inactive,
when aggregate productivity is low. Shocks to firm productivity create obvious issues for RPE, as
a very large and productive firm may suddenly become unproductive, and then face contrasting
incentives to offer its employees a high value, its sheer size and retention needs against low
productivity. Similarly, highly profitable business opportunities may arise and cause entry of
highly productive firms, which by definition start out with a size of zero.
Clearly a similar phenomenon occurs when the productivity of existing firms is subject to
idiosyncratic shocks. The relevant empirical questions, then, are (i) how much do entry and exit
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of firms and establishments contribute to aggregate employment fluctuations; and (ii) how variable
is a typical firm’s productivity at business cycle frequencies. To answer the first question, it is well
known that the contribution of entry and exit to the cyclical volatility of employment is modest.
The Business Employment Dynamics from the Bureau of Labor Statistics provide the relevant data
on job flows in the USA at quarterly frequency for 1992:Q3–2011:Q3. The standard deviation of
the HP-filtered net employment growth rate is 0.57. The analogous statistic equals 0.1 for: the net
percentage increase in employment due to opening establishments, the net percentage decrease
due to closing establishments, and the difference between the two (entry minus exit). For the
second question, the available empirical evidence using longitudinal business microdata is mostly
limited to the manufacturing sector. Summarizing the results of the early literature, Bartelsman
and Doms (2000) conclude that firm-level productivity is best characterized as a unit-root process.
Haltiwanger et al. (2008, Table 3) find that establishment-level TFP is very persistent, about as
much as aggregate TFP. MPV12 show with data from a few countries that several correlated
features of a firm, such as its size, the average wages it pays, and its revenue-based productivity,
when measured at one point in time strongly predict how job creation by the same firm responds
to business cycle shocks that hit it over two decades later. This striking phenomenon suggests that
our assumption of fixed firm productivity might be a reasonable approximation for our purposes,
at least at business cycle frequencies. We note that the assumption of fixed and heterogeneous
firm-level TFP has become commonplace in the International Trade literature (Eaton and Kortum,
2002; Melitz, 2003).
From a theoretical standpoint, however, the question remains whether one can analyse
aggregate dynamics in wage-posting models in the presence of idiosyncratic shocks to firm
productivity. As discussed in Section 2, to answer this question, CM assume a specific hiring
technology, which makes contracts size-independent. In contrast, models that allow ex-post
competition between employers for employed workers always implement efficient turnover, as
those models all share the auction-flavoured property that the employer with the highest valuation
of the worker’s services (i.e. the most productive employer) always succeeds in hiring/retaining
the worker.23 These models, however, do not have a well-defined notion of firm size.
7.3. Other determinants of firm size
Finally, we are aware that multiple factors, beyond employment frictions, contribute to determine
the size of a firm, most notably capital adjustment costs, including financial frictions, and
diminishing marginal revenues from hiring, due to either technology (decreasing returns to
labour), span of control frictions, or price-making power. Diminishing returns in wage-posting
models have been partially explored in a steady-state context (Manning, 1992), and can invalidate
some of the equilibrium properties, such as the absence of atoms in the offer distribution. We
cannot identify, though, obvious reasons why they would overturn the main result that equilibrium
must be RP. To violate this property, a more productive firm would have to optimally hire so many
more workers as to drive its marginal revenue of labour below that of a less productive firm. This
is another avenue for future investigation.
8. CONCLUSION
This article is the first to characterize stochastic equilibrium of an economy where the Law of
One Price fails due to random search frictions and monopsony power, a problem that was long
23. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), Dey and Flinn (2005), Cahuc et al. (2006)—see also Postel-Vinay and Turon
(2010) for an example with idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
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held to be intractable. Specifically, we introduce aggregate productivity shocks in a wage-posting
model a la Burdett and Mortensen (1998), and we allow for rich state-contingent employment
contracts. By extending the theory of Monotone Comparative Statics to a Dynamic Programming
environment, we identify sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium is unique, constrained
efficient, and very tractable. The second best is decentralized by contracts that do not respond to
outside offers. The equilibrium stochastic dynamics of this model economy exhibit qualitative
properties that are in line with the new business cycle facts that we illustrate in Moscarini and
Postel-Vinay (2009, 2010b, 2012): small firms as a group exhibit less cyclical net job creation
and returns to capital than large firms.
Future research will pursue a full quantitative analysis of this model, to illustrate its practicality
as a tool for business cycle analysis. In MPV10a we illustrate an algorithm to solve quickly
and efficiently for equilibrium with exogenous contact rates, and we present some preliminary
quantitative results. The constrained efficient allocation in the stochastic economy already
naturally explains why larger firms have more cyclical net job creation. We believe that the
slow propagation of aggregate shocks to average labour productivity and wages, due to the slow
upgrading of labour through job-to-job quits, is an important feature of actual business cycles
which is missing altogether from existing quantitative business cycle models. The extensions
mentioned above, as well as possibly others, are bound to help the quantitative performance of
the model.
APPENDIX
In order to prove the main statements, we heavily rely on the recursive formulation of the contracting problem.
Therefore, we need to spell out the notation, including all arguments of the value and policy functions. We drop the time
index and use primes to denote next period’s values. We also make the dependence on state variables p,L,ω,N explicit,
so in the candidate equilibrium a firm of type p offers a value V
(
p,L(p),ω′,N
)
. A subscript of a function now denotes
the variable of partial differentiation of that function. Let λω ∈(0,1) denote the chance of contact with a hiring firm in
current state of aggregate productivity ω, δω ∈(0,1) the chance of exogenous separation, bω the flow unemployment
benefit, F
(
W |ω′,N) the offer distribution given that all firms follow the Markov offer strategy V , G(W |ω′,N) the value
distribution. In fully recursive notation, the laws of motion of firm size (8) and employment distribution (10) become
L′ =L (L,W ,ω′,N) :=L(1−δω′)(1−sλω′ F(W |ω′,N))+λω′ [1−N (p)]I{W ≥U (ω,N)}
+sλω′ (1−δω′ )N (p)G(W |ω′,N)
N
(
p |ω′,N)′ =∫ p
p
L
(
L(x),V (x,L(x),ω′,N),ω′,N)d(x)⇒N (· |ω′,N)′ :=N (ω′,N)
the Bellman equation of the unemployed worker (7) reads
U (ω,N)=bω +β
∫

[(
1−λω′
)
U
(
ω′,N
(
ω′,N
))+λω′ ∫ max〈v,U (ω′,N (ω′,N))〉dF(v |ω′,N)]H (dω′ |ω)
and the key DP problem (14) reads
S(p,L,ω,N)=ωpL+β
∫

{
δω
′
U
(
ω′,N
(
ω′,N
))
L+ sup
W(ω′)≥U(ω′,N (ω′,N))
〈
S
(
p,L
(
L,W
(
ω′
)
,ω′,N
)
,ω′,N
(
ω′,N
))
+L
(
1−δω′
)
sλω
′
∫ +∞
W(ω′)
vdF
(
v |ω′,N)
−W (ω′)[λω′ (1−N (p))+sλω′ (1−δω′)N (p)G(W (ω′) |ω′,N)]〉}H (dω′ |ω). (A.1)
A. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
The claim is: if problem (A.1) has a solution, then any measurable selection V (p,L,ω,N) from the optimal correspondence
is such that V (p,L,ω,N) is increasing in p and L.
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Our proof strategy is as follows. First, we define certain supermodularity properties SM of a value function that imply
that the maximizer V in (A.1) is increasing in p. Then, we fix an arbitrary N and show that the Bellman operator in (A.1)
for the restricted problem with fixed N is a contraction mapping from the space of SM functions into itself, and that this
space is Banach and closed under the sup norm. Therefore, for any fixed N (A.1) has a unique solution. Finally, if there
exists a solution S to (A.1) when N is not fixed, then S must also solve the restricted problem (A.1) for any fixed N . By
uniqueness and SM of the solution to the restricted problem any solution to the unrestricted problem must also have the
SM properties. We cannot extend the same logic to show existence of S with variable N because Blackwell’s sufficient
conditions for a contraction mapping apply only to functions over Rn.
We introduce the following notation:
ϕ(p,L,ω,N) :=ωpL+β
∫

δω
′
U
(
ω′,N
(
ω′,N
))
LQ(dω′ |ω),

(
L,W
(
ω′
)
,ω′,N
) :=L(1−δω′)sλω′ ∫ +∞
W(ω′)
vdF
(
v |ω′,N)
−W (ω′)[λω′ (1−N (p))+sλω′ (1−δω′)N (p)G(W (ω′) |ω′,N)].
So fix N to be some given positive and increasing function over
[
p,p
]
with N (p)=0. Then, for any function S (p,L,ω),
we define the following operator MN:
MNS (p,L,ω) :=ϕ(p,L,ω,N)+β
∫

max
W(ω′)
〈
S
[
p,L
(
L,W
(
ω′
)
,ω′,N
)
,ω′
]+(L,W (ω′),ω′,N)〉Q(dω′ |ω). (A.2)
The worker participation constraint W ≥U can be ignored in the proof. To see why, observe the following. Once we
establish that an interior solution is weakly increasing in p, we can conclude that any set of firms that offers a corner
solution W =U and shuts down must be the set of the least productive firms. But then, the global solution, including
the corner, is weakly increasing in p, strictly so above the corner by Proposition 1, as claimed. Incidentally, if all firms
offered U, from the previous reasoning (and barring the trivial case where all firms are too unproductive to operate) the
most productive firms would deviate and profitably offer more, so there exist always some firms that have an interior
solution where the worker participation constraint does not bind.
Lemma A.1. Let S (p,L,ω) be bounded, continuous in p and L, increasing and convex in L and with increasing
differences in (p,L) over
(
p,p
)
×(0,1). Then:
(1) MNS is bounded and continuous in p and L;
(2) There exists a measurable selection V (p,L,ω,N) from the maximizing correspondence associated with MNS ;
(3) Any such measurable selection V is increasing in p and L;
(4) MNS is increasing and convex in L and with increasing differences in (p,L) over
(
p,p
)
×(0,1).
Proof In this proof, wherever possible without causing confusion, we will make the dependence of all functions on
aggregate state variables ω and N implicit to streamline the notation.
Points (1) and (2) of this lemma are immediate: continuity of MNS follows from Berge’s Theorem (Stokey and
Lucas, 1989, Theorem 3.6). Boundedness of MNS is obvious by construction. Existence of a measurable selection from
the maximizing correspondence associated with MNS is a direct consequence of the Measurable Selection Theorem
(Stokey and Lucas, 1989, Theorem 7.6).
To prove point (3), we first establish that the maximand in (A.2) has increasing differences in (p,W) and (L,W).
Monotonicity of V in p and L will then follow from standard monotone comparative statics arguments.24 Proving that the
maximand in (A.2) has increasing differences in (p,W) is immediate as  is independent of p: letting τ >0, differences
in p of the maximand equal S (p+τ,L (L,W))−S (p,L (L,W)) which is increasing in W because L is increasing in
W by construction and S has increasing differences in (p,L) by assumption. We thus now fix p and focus on establishing
that the maximand in (A.2) has increasing differences in (L,W). To this end, first note that, since S is assumed to be
continuous and convex in L, it has left and right derivatives everywhere (and those two can at most differ at countably
many points). Now take L and ε>0 and define the difference in L of the maximand in (A.2):
D (W) :=S (p,L (L+ε,W))−S (p,L (L,W))+ε(1−δω′ )sλω′
∫ +∞
W
vdF
(
v |ω′).
24. See Section 4 of the Supplementary Material for details.
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(The dependence of D on p is kept implicit.) We want to establish that D (W) is increasing in W . We do not know whether
F and G, thus D , are differentiable, so we proceed by showing that the upper-right Dini derivative of D (W), which we
denote as D+D (W) and which exists everywhere (although possibly equalling ±∞), is everywhere positive. Take x>0:
D (W +x)−D (W)=S (p,L (L+ε,W +x))−S (p,L (L+ε,W))−[S (p,L (L,W +x))−S (p,L (L,W))]
−ε(1−δω′ )sλω′
∫ W+x
W
vdF
(
v |ω′).
Majorizing the last integral:
D (W +x)−D (W)≥S (p,L (L+ε,W +x))−S (p,L (L+ε,W))−[S (p,L (L,W +x))−S (p,L (L,W))]
−ε(1−δω′ )sλω′ (W +x)[F(W +x |ω′)−F(W |ω′)].
Dividing through by x and taking the limit superior as x→0+ (using the definition of L , continuity of F and G, and
some basic properties of Dini derivatives), we obtain:
D+D (W)≥SL,r (p,L (L+ε,W))·sλω′ (1−δω′ )
{
(L+ε)D+F(W |ω′)+N (p)D+G(W |ω′)}
−SL,r (p,L (L,W))·sλω′ (1−δω′ )
{
LD+F
(
W |ω′)+N (p)D+G(W |ω′)}−ε(1−δω′ )sλω′ WD+F(W |ω′),
where, in standard fashion, fx, [fx,r ] is used to designate the left [right] partial derivative of any function f w.r.t. x, and
D+f denotes the lower-right Dini derivative of f . Because F and G are increasing, their Dini derivatives are such that
D+F ≥D+F ≥0 (and likewise for G). Because S is convex in L by assumption, SL,r is increasing in L. Combining all
those properties, the latter inequality implies:
D+D (W)≥[SL,r (p,L (L,W))−W]·(1−δω′ )sλω′εD+F(W |ω′). (A.3)
The only way the RHS in this last inequality can be negative is if SL,r (p,L (L,W))−W <0. We now show that this
cannot be if W is an optimal selection. Let V be an optimal selection and let x>0. Optimality requires that
0≥S (p,L (L,V −x))+L(1−δω′ )sλω′
∫ +∞
V−x
vdF
(
v |ω′)−(V −x)(λω′ (1−N (p))+sλω′ (1−δω′ )N (p)G(V −x |ω′))
−S (p,L (L,V))−L(1−δω′ )sλω′
∫ +∞
V
vdF
(
v |ω′)+V(λω′ (1−N (p))+sλω′ (1−δω′ )N (p)G(V |ω′)).
Collecting terms and majorizing the integral terms as we did for D :
0≥S(p,L (L,V −x))−S (p,L (L,V))+L(1−δω′ )sλω′ (V −x)[F(V −x |ω′)−F(V |ω′)]
−Vsλω′ (1−δω′ )N (p)[G(V −x |ω′)−G(V |ω′)]+x(λω′ (1−N (p))+sλω′ (1−δω′ )N (p)G(V |ω′)).
Now again taking the limit superior as x→0+ (in what follows D−F and D−F designate the upper and lower left Dini
derivative of F, respectively, and likewise for G):25
0≥−SL, (p,L (L,V))·sλω′ (1−δω′ )
{
LD−F
(
V |ω′)+N (p)D−G(V |ω′)}
+Vsλω′ (1−δω′ ){LD−F(V |ω′)+N (p)D−G(V |ω′)}+λω′ (1−N (p))+sλω′ (1−δω′ )N (p)G(V |ω′).
Finally recalling that D−F ≥D−F ≥0 (and likewise for G), the latter inequality implies:
SL, (p,L (L,V))−V ≥ λ
ω′ (1−N (p))+sλω′ (1−δω′ )N (p)G(V |ω′)
sλω
′ (1−δω′ ){LD−F (V |ω′)+N (p)D−G(V |ω′)} ≥0. (A.4)
This, together with (A.3), shows that D+D (V)≥0 at all V which is an optimal selection, i.e. at all V in the support of F.
To finally establish that D is increasing over the support of F, recall that, as F and G are continuous by Proposition 1, so
is W 	→L (L,W). Moreover, as S is convex in L (by assumption), it is continuous w.r.t. L. Thus by inspection, D is a
continuous function of W . Continuity plus the fact that D+D (V)≥0 are sufficient to ensure that D is strictly increasing
(see, e.g. Proposition 2 in Royden, 1988, p. 99). Point (3) of the lemma is thus proven.
Now on to point (4). Take (p0,L0)∈
(
p,p
)
×(0,1) and ε>0 such that (p0 +ε,L0 +ε) are still in
(
p,p
)
×(0,1).
We first consider right-differentiability of MNS w.r.t. L at L0. Fixing an arbitrary selection V from the optimal policy
25. This uses the facts that SL, ≥0, that F and G are continuous, and that D− [−f ]=−D−f for any function f .
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correspondence, we note that, while V may have a discontinuity at (p0,L0), the fact that it is increasing in L ensures that
V
(
p0,L+0 ,ω′
) := limε→0+ V (p0,L0 +ε,ω′) exists everywhere (and likewise for V (p+0 ,L0,ω′)). By point (3), V (p0,L+0 ,ω′)
is increasing in L0. Then
MNS (p0,L0 +ε)−MNS
(
p0,L+0
)=ϕ(p0,L0 +ε)−ϕ(p0,L0)+β∫

〈
S
[
p0,L
(
L0 +ε,V
(
p0,L0 +ε,ω′
))]
−S [p0,L (L0,V (p0,L+0 ,ω′))]
+(L0 +ε;V (p0,L0 +ε,ω′))−(L0;V (p0,L+0 ,ω′))〉Q(dω′|ω)
≥ϕ(p0,L0 +ε)−ϕ(p0,L0)+β
∫

〈
S
[
p0,L
(
L0 +ε,V
(
p0,L+0 ,ω
′))]
−S [p0,L (L0,V (p0,L+0 ,ω′))]+(L0 +ε;V (p0,L+0 ,ω′))
−(L0;V (p0,L+0 ,ω′))〉Q(dω′|ω)=(ωp0 +β∫

δω
′
U
(
ω′
)Q(dω′|ω))·ε
+β
∫

〈
S
[
p0,L
(
L0 +ε,V
(
p0,L+0 ,ω
′))]−S [p0,L (L0,V (p0,L+0 ,ω′))]
+ε ·(1−δω′ )sλω′
∫ +∞
V
(
p0,L+0 ,ω′
)vdF(v |ω′)〉Q(dω′|ω), (A.5)
where the last equality follows from the definitions of ϕ and . Symmetrically
MNS (p0,L0 +ε)−MNS
(
p0,L+0
)=ϕ(p0,L0 +ε)−ϕ(p0,L0)+β∫

〈
S
[
p0,L
(
L0 +ε,V
(
p0,L0 +ε,ω′
))]
−S [p0,L (L0,V (p0,L+0 ,ω′))]
+(L0 +ε;V (p0,L0 +ε,ω′))−(L0;V (p0,L+0 ,ω′))〉Q(dω′|ω)
≤
(
ωp0 +β
∫

δω
′
U
(
ω′
)Q(dω′|ω))·ε+β∫

〈
S
[
p0,L
(
L0 +ε,V
(
p0,L0 +ε,ω′
))]
−S [p0,L (L0,V (p0,L0 +ε,ω′))]
+ε ·(1−δω′ )sλω′
∫ +∞
V(p0,L0+ε,ω′)
vdF
(
v |ω′)〉Q(dω′|ω). (A.6)
Now dividing through by ε in (A.5) and (A.6), and invoking continuity w.r.t. V of LL (L,V)= (1−δω′ )
(
1−sλω′ F (V)
)
(by continuity of F), everywhere right-differentiability of S w.r.t. L (by convexity of S ), and existence of a right
limit of V at any L0 (by monotonicity of V established in point (1) of this lemma), we see that the lower and upper
bounds of (1/ε)[MNS (p0,L0 +ε)−MNS (p0,L+0 )] exhibited in (A.5) and (A.6) both converge to the same limit as
ε→0+, which, together with continuity of MNS in L at L0 which implies MNS
(
p0,L+0
)=MNS (p0,L0), establishes
right-differentiability of MNS w.r.t L with the following expression for
[
MNS
]
L,r (p,L)
[
MNS
]
L,r
(p,L)=ωp+β
∫

δω
′
U
(
ω′
)Q(dω′|ω)+β∫

〈
SL,r
[
p,L
(
L,V
(
p,L+,ω′
))]·LL (L,V (p,L+,ω′))
+(1−δω′ )sλω′
∫ +∞
V(p,L+,ω′)
vdF
(
v |ω′)〉Q(dω′ |ω).
(A.7)
Straightforward inspection shows that
[
MNS
]
L,r (p,L)>0, so that M
NS is increasing in L. We now show that[
MNS
]
L,r (p,L) is increasing in L and p. It is sufficient to show that the term under the
∫
in (A.7) is increasing in
L and p for all ω′ ∈. We begin with L. Let L1 <L2 ∈ [0,1]2. To lighten the notation, let Vk =V
(
p,L+k ,ω′
)
for k =1,2.
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Because V is increasing in L, V2 ≥V1. Then
SL,r [p,L (L2,V2)]·LL (L2,V2)−SL,r [p,L (L1,V1)]·LL (L1,V1)−(1−δω′ )sλω′
∫ V2
V1
vdF
(
v |ω′)
= [LL (L2,V2)−LL (L1,V1)] ·SL,r [p,L (L2,V2)]+LL (L1,V1)·
(
SL,r [p,L (L2,V2)]−SL,r [p,L (L1,V1)]
)
−(1−δω′ )sλω′
∫ V2
V1
vdF
(
v |ω′)=LL (L1,V1)·(SL,r [p,L (L2,V2)]−SL,r [p,L (L1,V1)])
+(1−δω′ )sλω′
∫ V2
V1
(
SL,r [p,L (L2,V2)]−v
)
dF
(
v |ω′),
where the last equality stems from the definition of LL . Because SL,r and L are both increasing in L, and because L is
also increasing in V , the first term in the r.h.s. of the last equality above is positive. Finally, convexity of S combined with
the first-order condition (A.4) implies that SL,r [p,L (L2,V2)]≥SL, [p,L (L2,V2)]≥V2, so that SL,r [p,L (L2,V2)]≥v
for all v≤V2, implying that the integral term is non-negative. This shows that
[
MNS
]
L,r is (strictly) increasing in L.
The proof that
[
MNS
]
L,r is strictly increasing in p proceeds along similar lines (details available upon request). Thus
MNS is a continuous function whose right partial derivative w.r.t. L exists everywhere, is increasing in L—which proves
convexity w.r.t. L—, and increasing in p—which proves increasing differences in (p,L). ‖
Now consider the set of functions defined over [p,p]×[0,1]× that are continuous in (p,L) and call it C[p,p]×[0,1]×.
That set is a Banach space when endowed with the sup norm.As LemmaA.1 suggests we will be interested in the properties
of a subset C′[p,p]×[0,1]× ⊂C[p,p]×[0,1]× of functions that are increasing and convex in L and have increasing differences
in (p,L). We next prove two ancillary lemmas, which will establish as a corollary (Corollary A.1) that C′[p,p]×[0,1]× is
closed in C[p,p]×[0,1]× under the sup norm.26
Lemma A.2. Let X be an interval in R and fn : X →R, N ∈N such that {fn} converges uniformly to f . Then
(1) if fn is non-decreasing for all n, so is f ;
(2) if fn is convex for all n, so is f .
Proof For point (1), take (x1,x2)∈X2 such that x2 >x1. Fix k ∈N. By uniform convergence, ∃nk ∈N : ∀n≥nk , ∀x∈X ,
|fn (x)−f (x)|< 12k . Then
f (x2)−f (x1)= f (x2)−fnk (x2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>−1/2k
+fnk (x2)−fnk (x1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 by monotonicity of fnk
+fnk (x1)−f (x1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>−1/2k
>−1
k
.
As the above is valid for an arbitrary choice of k ∈N and (x1,x2)∈X2, it establishes that f is non-decreasing. For point (2),
uniform convergence of {fn} to f implies pointwise convergence, so that Theorem 6.2.35 in Corbae et al. (2009, p. 282)
can be applied. ‖
Lemma A.3. Let X ⊂R2 be a convex set and fn :X →R, N ∈N be functions with increasing differences such that {fn}
converges uniformly to f . Then f has increasing differences.
Proof Let {(x1,y1),(x2,y2)}∈X2 such that x2 >x1 and y2 >y1. Fix k ∈N. By uniform convergence, ∃nk ∈N : ∀n≥nk ,
∀(x,y)∈X, |fn (x,y)−f (x,y)|< 14k . Then
f (x2,y2)−f (x1,y2)= f (x2,y2)−fnk (x2,y2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>−1/4k
+fnk (x2,y2)−fnk (x1,y2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>fnk (x2,y1)−fnk (x1,y1) by ID of fnk
+fnk (x1,y2)−f (x1,y2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>−1/4k
>− 1
2k
+fnk (x2,y1)−fnk (x1,y1)=−
1
2k
+fnk (x2,y1)−f (x2,y1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>−1/4k
+f (x2,y1)−f (x1,y1)
+f (x1,y1)−fnk (x1,y1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>−1/4k
>−1
k
+f (x2,y1)−f (x1,y1).
26. While for the purposes of this proof (which is concerned with closedness under the sup norm) both lemmas are
stated for sequences that converge uniformly, it is straightforward to extend them to the case of pointwise convergent
sequences.
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As the above is valid for an arbitrary choice of k ∈N and {(x1,y1),(x2,y2)}∈X2, it establishes that f has increasing
differences. ‖
Corollary A.1. The set C′[
p,p
]
×[0,1]× of functions defined over
[
p,p
]
×[0,1]× that are increasing and convex in L
and have increasing differences in (p,L) is a closed subset of C[
p,p
]
×[0,1]× under the sup norm.
The latter corollary establishes that, given a fixed N , the set of functions that are relevant to Lemma A.1 is a closed
subset of a Banach space of functions under the sup norm. The following lemma shows that the operator considered in
Lemma A.1 is a contraction under that same norm.
Lemma A.4. The operator MN defined in (A.2) maps C′[
p,p
]
×[0,1]× into itself and is a contraction of modulus β under
the sup norm.
Proof That MN maps C′[
p,p
]
×[0,1]× into itself flows directly from part of the proof of Lemma A.1. To prove that
M is a contraction, it is straightforward to check using (A.2) that MN satisfies Blackwell’s sufficient conditions with
modulus β. ‖
We are now in a position to prove the proposition. Given the initially fixed N , the operator MN, which by Lemma A.4
is a contraction from C[
p,p
]
×[0,1]× into itself, and has a unique fixed point SN in that set (by the Contraction Mapping
Theorem). Moreover, since C′[
p,p
]
×[0,1]× is a closed subset of C
[
p,p
]
×[0,1]× (Lemma A.2) and since M
N also maps
C′[
p,p
]
×[0,1]× into itself (Lemma A.1), that fixed point SN belongs to C
′[
p,p
]
×[0,1]×.
Summing up, what we have established thus far is that for any fixed N ∈C[
p,p
]
, the operator MN over functions of
(p,L,ω) has a unique, bounded, and continuous fixed point S 	N =MNS 	N ∈C′[p,p]×[0,1]× ⊂C[p,p]×[0,1]×.
We finally turn to the Bellman operator M which is relevant to the firm’s problem. That operator M applies to
functions S defined on
[
p,p
]
×[0,1]××C[
p,p
] and is defined as the following “extension” of MN:
MS (p,L,ω,N) :=ϕ(p,L,ω,N)+β
∫

max
W(ω′)
〈
S
[
p,L
(
L,W (ω′),ω′,N),ω′,N (ω′,N)]
+(L,W (ω′),ω′,N)〉Q(dω′ |ω).
If an equilibrium exists, then a firm has a best response and a value S which solves S=MS. For every N ∈C[
p,p
]
, by
definition of M and MN this implies S=MNS. Since the fixed point of MN is unique, if S=MS exists then for every fixed
N ∈C[
p,p
] we have for all (p,L,ω)∈[p,p]×[0,1]×: S(p,L,ω,N)=S 	N (p,L,ω). Therefore, if the value function S and
an equilibrium of the contract-posting game exist, then S∈C′[
p,p
]
×[0,1]×: the typical firm’s value function is continuous in
p and L, increasing and convex in L and has increasing differences in (p,L). By the same standard monotone comparative
statics arguments that we invoked in the proof of Lemma A.1, the maximizing correspondence is increasing in p and L
in the strong set sense, hence all of its measurable selections are weakly increasing in p and L.
B. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
In an attempt to simplify the notation without causing confusion, we define the value offered by firm p in equilibrium:
V 	 (p,ω) :=V (p,L	 (p),ω,N	)
for use throughout this proof. This notation keeps the dependence of V on N implicit.
The main purpose of Proposition 4 is actually to establish claim (2), continuous differentiability of V 	. Our proof
strategy is as follows. We know from Proposition 2 that the optimal policy V 	 is increasing in p, hence differentiable a.e.
It remains to show that it is continuously differentiable everywhere. To do so, first, we establish continuity properties of
V (p,L,ω,N	) in p, both for fixed L and for L=L	 (p), and in L at L=L	 (p) for fixed p. Using these properties, we show
that any solution to the Bellman equation defining S(p,L,ω,N) when all other firms are playing a RPE is differentiable in
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L at L=L	 (p) and such that p 	→S(p,L	 (p),ω,N	) is continuous; i.e. on the equilibrium path the shadow marginal value
of one worker always exists and is continuous in firm productivity. Next, we exploit this property and the implications of
RPE to show that the optimal policy V 	 is indeed continuously differentiable everywhere.
We begin with an ancillary lemma, which is interesting in its own right.
Lemma A.5. V has the following continuity properties along the (RP) Equilibrium path:
(1) p 	→V (p,L	 (p),ω,N	)=V 	 (p,ω) is continuous;
(2) L 	→V (p,L,ω,N	) is continuous at L=L	 (p);
(3) q 	→V (q,L	 (p),ω,N	) is continuous at q=p.
Proof p 	→V 	 (p,ω) is increasing by Proposition 2, so V 	 can only have (countably many) jump discontinuities. But then
a jump discontinuity in V 	 would imply a gap in the support of F, which is inconsistent with equilibrium as argued in
Section A of the Appendix . This proves claim (1) of the lemma.
For claim (2), fix p and ε>0. Then by continuity of V 	 (point (1) of this lemma), ∃α>0 : ∀σ ∈
(0,α], V 	 (p,ω)≤V 	 (p+σ,ω)≤V 	 (p,ω)+ε. But then monotonicity of V in L and in p (see Section A
of the Appendix) further implies: V 	 (p,ω)≤V (p,L	 (p+σ),ω,N	)≤V 	 (p+σ,ω)≤V 	 (p,ω)+ε, so that ∀L∈
[L	 (p),L	 (p+σ)], V (p,L,ω,N	)−V (p,L	 (p),ω,N	)≤ε, which establishes right-continuity of V in L at L	 (p).
Left-continuity is established in the same way, and so is claim (3). ‖
We now go on to establish point (1) of the proposition. In so doing, to avoid notational overload, we will keep the
dependence of all value functions and laws of motion on N	 implicit. Now first, convexity of S w.r.t. L was established
as a by-product of Proposition 2 (see Section A of the Appendix), and implies that S is everywhere left-and right-
differentiable w.r.t. L, and that the right and left derivatives SL,r and SL, are both increasing functions of L. As such they
have right and left limits everywhere. We can thus define SL,r
(
p,L+,ω
)= limε→0+SL,r (p,L+ε,ω), and symmetrically
SL,
(
p,L−,ω
)= limε→0+SL, (p,L−ε,ω). Now following exactly the same steps as in (A.5) and (A.6) (see the proof of
Lemma A.1 in Section A of the Appendix), only applied to S, we establish
SL,r
(
p,L+,ω
)=ωp+β∫

δω
′
U
(
ω′
)Q(dω′ |ω)+β∫

〈
SL,r
[
p,L
(
L,V
(
p,L+,ω′
)
,ω′
)
,ω′
]·LL (L,V (p,L+,ω′),ω′)
+
(
1−δω′
)
sλω
′
∫ +∞
V(p,L+,ω′)
vdF
(
v |ω′)〉Q(dω′ |ω).
Next, the facts that V is increasing in L (see the proof of Proposition 2) and continuous in L at L=L	 (p) (from
Lemma A.5), combined with continuity of L and LL w.r.t. V (by continuity of F), imply that LL
(
L,V
(
p,L+,ω′
)
,ω′
)=
LL
(
L,V
(
p,L,ω′
)
,ω′
)
and SL,r
[
p,L
(
L,V
(
p,L+,ω′
)
,ω′
)
,ω′
]=SL,r[p,L (L,V (p,L,ω′),ω′)+ ,ω′] at L=L	 (p). As a
further consequence
SL,r
(
p,L	 (p)+ ,ω
)=ωp+β∫

δω
′
U
(
ω′
)Q(dω′ |ω)+β∫

〈
SL,r
[
p,L
(
L	 (p),V	
(
p,ω′
)
,ω′
)+
,ω′
]
·LL
(
L	 (p),V	
(
p,ω′
)
,ω′
)+(1−δω′)sλω′ ∫ +∞
V	(p,ω′)
vdF
(
v |ω′)〉Q(dω′ |ω).
(A.8)
A symmetric expression can be arrived at in the same way for SL,
(
p,L	 (p)− ,ω
)
.
Let DLSL (p,L,ω) :=SL,r
(
p,L+,ω
)−SL,(p,L−,ω), positive by convexity of S in L. Moreover, because SL, ≥0, it
follows that DLSL ≤SL,r. But then clearly, SL,r (p,L	 (p),ω) is bounded above by the maximum feasible output per worker
in the economy, maxωp/(1−β). This proves that DLSL is uniformly bounded above and below. Now
DLSL
(
p,L	 (p),ω
)=β∫

DLSL
[
p,L
(
L	 (p),V	
(
p,ω′
)
,ω′
)
,ω′
]·LL (L	 (p),V	(p,ω′),ω′)Q(dω′ |ω)
<β
∫

DLSL
[
p,L
(
L	 (p),V	
(
p,ω′
)
,ω′
)
,ω′
]Q(dω′ |ω).
Iterating the last inequality shows that 0≤DLSL (p,L	 (p),ω)<βn maxωp/(1−β) for all n∈N, which implies that
DLSL (p,L
	 (p),ω)=0 for all (p,ω) and that SL exists everywhere. Since S is convex, SL is increasing, hence it can
only have jumps up. But we just concluded that its right and left limit are equal everywhere, so SL is continuous for all
L∈ [0,1).
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We finally prove continuity of x 	→SL (x,L	 (p),ω) at x=p. Because S has increasing differences in (p,L) (as
established in Section A of the Appendix), x 	→SL (x,L	 (p),ω) is increasing, therefore continuous except for at most
countably many upward jumps. Now defining DpSL (p,L,ω) :=SL
(
p+,L,ω
)−SL (p,L,ω):
D
p
SL
(
p,L	 (p),ω
)=β∫

D
p
SL
[
p,L
(
L	 (p),V	
(
p,ω′
)
,ω′
)
,ω′
]·LL (L	 (p),V	(p,ω′),ω′)Q(dω′ |ω)
<β
∫

D
p
SL
[
p,L
(
L	 (p),V	
(
p,ω′
)
,ω′
)
,ω′
]Q(dω′ |ω).
(This uses continuity of V 	 w.r.t. p, of L w.r.t. V , and continuity of SL (p,L,ω) in L at L=L	 (p).) Moreover, DpSL ≥0 since
SL is increasing in p, and DpSL is uniformly bounded above by maxωp/(1−β) for the same reasons as DLSL . Iterating
the above inequality establishes that DpSL (p,L
	 (p),ω)=0 for all (p,ω), so that x 	→SL (x,L	 (p),ω) is continuous at x=p.
Combined with continuity of SL (p,L,ω) in L at L=L	 (p) (proven above), and continuity of L	 (p) (from the assumption
that L0 is continuous), this established point (1) in the proposition.
We now prove point (2) of the proposition, namely that in any RPE, V 	 (p) is continuously differentiable. Consider
the problem of a firm choosing W to best-respond to all other firms playing a RPE. By a simple improvement argument,
W ∈
[
V 	
(
p,ω′
)
,V 	
(
p,ω′
)]
. Since V 	 is continuous and increasing, offering any such best response W is equivalent to
choosing a type q to imitate such that W =V 	(q,ω′). In any RPE, by Proposition 2, the best response by a firm p of
current size L	 (p) is ‘truthful revelation’, q=p, which solves
S
(
p,L	 (p),ω
)=ϕ(p,L	 (p),ω)+β∫

max
q(ω′)
〈
S
[
p,L
(
L	 (p),ω′,q
(
ω′
))
,ω′
]+(L	 (p),ω′,q(ω′))〉Q(dω′ |ω), (A.9)
where, with a slight abuse of notation:
L
(
L,ω′,q
)=L(1−δω′)(1−sλω′ F(V 	(q,ω′) |ω′))+λω′ (1−N (p))+sλω′ (1−δω′)N (p)G(V	(q,ω′) |ω′)
and

(
L,ω′,q
)=L(1−δω′)sλω′ ∫ +∞
V	(q,ω′)
vdF
(
v |ω′)−V 	(q,ω′)(λω′ (1−N (p))+sλω′ (1−δω′)N (p)G(V	(q,ω′) |ω′)).
Using the RP property
L
(
L,ω′,q
)=L	 (p)(1−δω′)(1−sλω′(q))+λω′ (1−N	 (p))+sλω′ (1−δω′)N	 (q)

(
L,ω′,q
)=L(1−δω′)sλω′ ∫ p
q
V 	
(
x,ω′
)
d(x)−V 	(q,ω′)(λω′ (1−N	 (p))+sλω′ (1−δω′)N	 (q)). (A.10)
Because V 	 is increasing, we know that it is differentiable almost everywhere, i.e. V 	p exists outside of a null set (say
NV ), and that for all p∈
[
p,p
]
\NV , V 	
(
p,ω′
)=V 	(p,ω′)+∫ pp V 	p (x,ω′)dx. Thus, for all p∈[p,p]\NV we can write a
NFOC for the maximization problem in (A.9), using (A.10), V 	p
(
p,ω′
)=v(p,ω′) where the function
v
(
p,ω′
) :=2sλω′ (1−δω′)L	 (p)γ (p) SL [p,L (L	 (p),V	(p,ω′),ω′),ω′]−V 	(p,ω′)
λω
′
(1−N (p))+sλω′ (1−δω′ )N	 (p)
is, by Lemma A.5, continuous in p over the interval
[
p,p
]
(recall that L	 is continuous by the assumption that L0 is).
Then,
V 	
(
p,ω′
)=V 	(p,ω′)+∫ p
p
V 	p
(
x,ω′
)
dx=V 	
(
p,ω′
)
+
∫ p
p
v
(
x,ω′
)
dx,
where the second equality follows from the fact that V 	p
(
p,ω′
) =v(p,ω′) only on a null set. So V 	(p,ω′) is the integral
of a continuous function v, hence it is continuously differentiable with V 	p
(
p,ω′
)=v(p,ω′) everywhere (i.e. the NFOC
V 	p
(
p,ω′
)=v(p,ω′) holds everywhere). Point (2) of the proposition is thus proven.
C. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
Let E[
p,p¯
] be the space of continuous c.d.f.’s over [p,p¯], F[
p,p
]
××E[p,p¯]
be the space of positive functions
[
p,p¯
]
××
E[
p,p¯
]→R2+ such that the first component is p-integrable and the second component does not depend on p. Then the
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operator T defined in (25) is a linear function onF[
p,p
]
××E[p,p]
which, by definition, preserves positivity of its arguments
and is such that the second component is independent of p, so that T mapsF[
p,p
]
××E[p,p]
into itself, whenever the function
is well-defined (the integrals exist).
We first show that the limit in (27) exists, is positive and uniformly bounded above. By assumption, ωtp and b(ωt) are
positive and uniformly bounded above by some K <+∞, therefore by the definition of T, Et {T[ωp,b(ω)](p |ωt+1)} is
also positive and uniformly bounded above by K , and by induction the same is true of Et
{
Tj [ωp,b(ω)](p |ωt+j)}. Hence
the sequence
∑n−1
j=0 β jEt
{
Tj [ωp,b(ω)](p |ωt+j)} is increasing and uniformly bounded above by K/(1−β), so each of
the two sums in this sequence must converge and the limit exists and is positive and bounded above by K/(1−β).
We next show that, if there exists a RPE, then it is given by (27). Suppose there exists a RPE (μU). By definition of a
RPE,
(
μ
U
)
must solve (26). Substituting forward in (26), we find for all n∈N:(
μt
Ut
)
(p) :=
n∑
j=0
β jEt
{
Tj [ωp,b(ω)](p |ωt+j)}+βn+1Et {Tn [μt+n,Ut+n](p |ωt+n)}. (A.11)
The proof of Proposition 2 further shows that S has increasing differences in (p,L), so that μ=SL is increasing in p. Then,
by inspection of Tμ: μt (p)=ωtp+βEt
{
Tμ [μt+1,Ut+1](p |ωt+1)
}≤K +βEtμt+1 (p). Iterating forward, this establishes
that μt (p)≤K/(1−β). But by definition of RPE and the fact that μt is increasing in p, 0≤Ut ≤μt (p)≤K/(1−β),
namely,
(
μ
U
)
is uniformly bounded above. Therefore, the last term in (A.11) is such that:
0≤βn+1Et
{
Tn [μt+n,Ut+n](p |ωt+n)
}≤βn+1K/(1−β) −→
n→+∞0,
and
(
μ
U
)
is given by (27) as claimed.
We finally turn to existence. We prove it by construction, i.e. by checking that the candidate
(
μ	
U	
)
defined in (27)
satisfies all the properties of a RPE. By construction,
(
μ	
U	
)
solves (26). Moreover, since (μ	U	) is uniformly bounded above,
it satisfies the TVC. So we only have to show that it satisfies 0≤U	 ≤TV [μ	,U	] and TV [μ	,U	] increasing in p. By
definition of TV :
∂TV
[
μ	t ,U	t
]
∂p
(p |ω)=
2 dHtdp (p)
Ht (p)
[
μ	t (p)−TV
[
μ	t ,U
	
t
]
(p |ω)]
= 2
dHt
dp (p)
Ht (p)
(
μ	t (p)−U	t −
∫ p
p
[
μ	t (x)−U	t
] ddp [Ht (x)2]
Ht (p)2
dx
)
so it suffices to prove that μ	t
(
p
)
≥Ut and μ	t is increasing in p at all dates. For this, consider an increasing function μ˜(p)
and a constant U˜ ≤ μ˜
(
p
)
. It is then straightforward to establish that Tμ
[
μ˜,U˜
]
(p |ω) is increasing in p. Moreover
Tμ
[
μ˜,U˜
](
p |ω
)
−TU
[
μ˜,U˜
]=(1−δ(ω))(1−sλ(ω))[μ˜(p)−U˜]
+λ(ω)[1−s(1−δ(ω))]
∫ p
p
1
H (x)2
∫ x
p
[
μ˜(z)−U˜] d
dp
[
H (z)2
]
dzd(x),
which is positive if 1−s(1−δ(ω))≥0 (the second condition in the proposition).Applying the above to μ˜(p)=ωp and U˜ =
b(ω) (which is less than ωp under the first condition in the proposition) establishes that Tμ [ωp,b(ω)](p |ω) is increasing
in p and greater than TU [ωp,b(ω)] for all p and ω. Repeating with μ˜(p)=Tμ [ωp,b(ω)](p |ω) and U˜ =TU [ωp,b(ω)],
and iterating ad infinitum shows that for all j, Tjμ [ωp,b(ω)](p |ω) is increasing in p and greater than TjU [ωp,b(ω)] for
all p and ω, which proves that μ	t
(
p
)
≥Ut and μ	t is increasing in p.
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